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The Defense of Traditional Marriage 
George W Dent, Jr.* 
The institution of marriage, which has been battered by decades of 
social and legal change, is now being buffeted by demands that 
marriage between persons of the same sex be legally recognized. For 
many, this is the paramount goal for gays: it would signify social 
acceptance of the moral equality of homosexuality and hetero­
sexuality.1 The Vermont Supreme Court recently boosted this 
campaign by requiring that the benefits of marriage be made available 
to same-sex couples.2 The court left it to the legislature whether to 
*
Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
The author is grateful for helpful suggestions from Teresa Collett, David Coolidge, Rick 
Duncan and Lynn Wardle and from participants in a symposium on same-sex marriage 
conducted by the University of Chicago Law School Roundtable. The author also thanks David 
Dieteman and Ross Miller for their able research assistance. 
l See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REAsON 311 (1992) (noting that "permitting 
homosexual marriage would be widely interpreted as placing a stamp of approval on 
homosexuality"); David L. Chambers, What If?: The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal 
Needs of  Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 450 (1996) (legal recognition 
"would signify the acceptance of lesbians and gay men as equal citizens more profoundly than 
any other nondiscrimination laws that might be adopted. Most proponents of same-sex 
marriage . .. want marriage first and foremost for this recognition.") (footnote omitted); 
Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK 6, FAL , 1989, at 12-
13 (arguing that gay marriage is "the political issue that most fully tests the dedication of 
people who are not gay to full equality of gay people"); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Tlmshold: 
Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. 
& Soc. CHANGE 567, 607 (1994) (the significance of marriage lies in its "emotional, declarative, 
and often religious power"). Accord Craig W. Christensen, If Not Maniage? On Secwing Gay and 
Lesbian Family Values by a "Simulacrum of Mmriage," 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1733, 1783-84 
(1998) ("[I]t is likely that the most far-reaching consequence of legalized same sex-marriage 
would be symbolic. ... In one step, society would confer, perforce, the symbolic legitimation 
of intimacy that is always implicit in the celebration of marriage."). See also Sheila Rose Foster, 
The Symbolism of Rights and the Costs of Symbolism: Some Thoughts on the Campaign fD1· Same-Sex 
Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 319, 321-23 (1998) (acknowledging the primacy of 
symbolism in the campaign for gay marriage). 
2 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). The decision was based on an unusual provision 
of the state constitution that reads, in pertinent part: 
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fulfill this command by recognizing scu-ne-sex marriages,3 or domestic 
partnerships, or otherwise. The demand for gay marriage deserves a 
rebuttal. Moreover, the arguments on both sides of this debate apply 
to many other relationships and activities (including polygamy, endog­
amy, cloning and bestiality) that have been denied recognition as mar­
riage and often condemned as crimes. Hence, the clamor for same-sex 
marriage also challenges these exclusions and prohibitions. 
This article reviews the possible justifications for legal recognition 
of marriage and finds some, such as encouraging stable, loving 
relationships, unpersuasive. However, other rationales-including 
protecting children, socializing adults, and promoting individual 
happiness-are valid, and these rationales apply only to traditional 
marriages. Accordingly, society has strong reasons to favor traditional 
marriage and to deny such treatment to tl1e unmarried and to 
homosexual, endogamous and bestial relationships. 
Part I of this article briefly reviews tl1e relevant law. Part II discusses 
That governn1eut is, or ought to be} instituted for ilie common benefit! protection, and 
security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolumen t or advan­
tage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community. 
Vt. Const., ch. I, art. 7. 
A couple of earlier rulings favoring same-sex marriage were later legislatively overruled. 
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 75, 82 ( Haw. 1 993) (holding state must show compelling a 
reason to deny recognition of same-sex marriages); on remand, Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1 394, 
1 996 WL 694235 ( Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1 996) (finding no compelling reason) .  1n 1 998 Hawaii 
voters passed a Marriage Amendment to the state constitution providing: "The legislature shall 
have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." Haw. Const., art. I, § 23 
( http:/ /www.state.hi.us/lrb/con/condoc.html (visited june 1 3, 2000 ) ) .  The Hawaii Supreme 
Court then held that the "amendment validated [the existing marriage statute] by taking 
statute out of tl1e ambi t of the [state] equal protection clause." Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-
1 394-05, 1 999 Haw. LEXIS 391,  at *3  (Haw. Dec. 9, 1 999) . 
A similar ruling in Alaska-Bmuse v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1 998 Wl� 
88743 (Alaska Super. Feb, 27, 1998)-was also overruled by an amendment to the state 
constitution. Alaska Canst., art. I, § 25 ( 1 998). 
3 Some commentators dislike the term "same-sex marriage" because it suggests a "farcical 
construct of . . .  a marriage touted to be not just for gays, but for any two persons of the same 
sex who wish to marry." Anthony C. Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin: A Step in the Right Direction for Goy 
Rights ?, 4 LAw & SEXUALilY 1, 3 ( 1994). This article will use the terms same-sex, gay and homo­
sexual marriage interchangeably. 
The word "homosexual" is also problematic: "t11ere is still no universally accepted 
definition of homosexuality among clinicians and behavioral scientists." William Byrne & 
Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual Orientation: The Biolngic Themies ReajJjnaised, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 228 ( 1 993). Difficulty arises in part because sexual orientation is not bipolar but 
forms a continuum from strictly heterosexual through bisexual to strictly homosexual. See infm 
note 1 55. This article will not posit a precise definition altlwugh this may result in occasional 
vagueness. 
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the legitimate grounds for law-making in the liberal state. Part III 
analyzes some invalid justifications for legal recognition of marriage. 
Part IV sets forth valid arguments for legal recognition. Part V rebuts 
the arguments for same-sex marriage and other unconventional forms 
of marriage. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
Traditionally, American law did not recognize same-sex marriage 
and courts routinely upheld this exclusion,4 but a few recent decisions 
have required their recognition.5 These decisions raised the question 
of whether other states would have to recognize gay marriages under 
the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.6 
Several states adopted laws to deny recognition of same-sex marriages 
even if validated in other states.7 Congress also adopted the Defense of 
Marriage Act providing that states need not recognize a same-sex 
marriage even if it is valid in another state and that in federal law mar­
riage is heterosexual and monogamous.8 
All legal systems recognize marriage. The criteria for a valid 
4 See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A2d 307, 310-31 (D.C. App. 1995); In re Ladrach, 
513 N.E.2d 828 (Oh. Ct. C.P. 1987); DeSanto v. Bamsley, 476 A.2d 952, 955-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984); McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1976); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 
1189 (Wash .  Ct. App. 1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); 
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971), app. dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 ( 1 972). For 
other cases upholding the traditional male-female definition of marriage, see Storrs v. 
Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (Sup. Ct. 1996); In re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (Sur. Ct. 
1990), aff'd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993); Succession of Bacot, 502 So.2d 1118, 1130 (La. 
Ct. App_. 1987); Slayton v. Texas, 633 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. App. 1982); Adams v. Howerton, 
486 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-23 (C.D. Cal. 1980), af 'd, 673 F.2d 1 036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 
U.S. 1 111 (1982); Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Anonymous v. 
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (Sup. Ct. 1971);. 
5 These cases are cited supra note 2. 
6 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. See Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAMEJ.L 
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 215, 236 (1995) . The Constitution may not require recognition. For 
example, recognition of polygamous or incestuous marriages is not required of states that have 
a strong policy against validating such marriages. See Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Mar­
riages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Pmcess Limitations on Stales' 
Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr 
v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE]. FAM. L. 551, 561-64 (1994). See generally F.H. Buckley & Larry E. 
Ribstein, A ChoiciHlfLaw Solution to the Maniage Debates (forthcoming) .  
7 See Lynn D .  Wardle, Williams v .  North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Maniage 
Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 239 ( 1998) (listing statutes as of late 1998) . 
8 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996) . 
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marriage vary. Thus, some cultures permit polygamy or endogamy, 
and others do not, but none has ever recognized gay marriages.9 
Some Scandinavian nations register and grant some benefits to "do­
mestic partnerships" of gay couples, but these arr;;mgements are still 
distinguished from marriage.10 The universal restriction of marriage 
to heterosexual relationships does not mean that the practice is 
instinctive, but it does show that the practice is not culturally 
contingent. If a custom is important to group survival, it "will be 
routinely rediscovered by every culture, without need of either genetic 
descent or cultural transmission of the particulars."11 
The issue here is not the permissibility but the legal recognition of 
same-sex marriages. Unlike polygamy and endogamy, gay marriage is 
not a crime, but neither is it legally valid. Two or rn,ore12 people of the 
same sex may wed, treat themselves as married, and be treated as such 
by all who wish to do so. These ceremonies have great emotional sig­
nificance for some people.13 Some corporations and local govern­
ments now give same-sex domestic partnerships certain employment 
9 "Cultures and religions throughout history have recognized various forms of marriage. 
Same-sex marriage has not been one of them." STEVEN F. NOLL, TWO SEXES, ONE FLESH: WHY 
THE CHURCH CANNOT BLESS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 41 (1997) . Historical recognition of gay 
marriage is at most a rare exception that proves the rule. John Boswell claimed the medieval 
Church treated some same-sex relationships as marriages. JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN 
PRE-MODERN EUROPE 191 (1994). Most scholars see these relationships as fraternal, not sexual. 
See Brent D. Shaw, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, July 18, 1994, at 33 (review of Boswell ) ;  Robin 
Darling Young, Gay Marriage: Reimagining Church Histo1y, FIRST THINGS, Nov., 1994, at 43-48; 
Constance Woods, Same-Sex Unions or Semantic Illusions?, COMMUNIO, Summer, 1995, at 316-317. 
William Eskridge catalogs many same-sex "marriages." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CAsE 
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15-50 (1996). However, most of these involve pederasty or 
transvestism, features that contemporary proponents of same-sex marriage disavow. In 
general, his examples would strike most people as repugnant, not as admirable relationships 
that society should endorse. See Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Maniage and Moml 
Discemment, 12 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 239, 249-50 (1998) (criticizing Eskridge's examples on moral 
grounds) . 
10 For example, these laws exclude most child-rearing rights. See Lynn D. Wardle, The 
Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 8�3, 892. See gen.emlly 
Lynn D. Wardle, Intemational Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition: A Sumey, 29 FAM. 
L.Q. 497, 500 (1995). 
11 DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE 
487 (1995). 
12 No state treats same-sex marriages as valid, so it seems that laws against polygamy do not 
apply to same-sex marriages. 
13 See Barbara]. Cox, Same-Sex Mmriage and Choice of Law: If We Many in Hawaii, Are We Still 
Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS . L. REV. 1033, 1037 n. 12 (describing the author's 
"commitment ceremony") .  
+ 
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and other benefits granted to married couples.14 
The nonrecognition of gay marriages has been challenged as an 
unconstitutional denial of equal protection. One question in the 
constitutional debate is the level of scrutiny that this practice deserves. 
Baehr held that the stringent "compelling justification" test applies 
under the Hawaii constitution.15 The United States Supreme Court 
has applied the more lenient "rational basis" test in rejecting an equal 
protection claim against a criminal sodomy law; the Court refused to 
add homosexuality to the short list of categories that merit compelling 
justification review.16 Scholars have debated this issue at lengthP To 
rehash this argument is unnecessary since the justifications for 
traditional marriage easily survive even the stricter standard of review. 
II. LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 
Marriage and sex raise questions about the legitimate scope of the 
law in liberal polities. The meaning of "liberal" is vague, but the core 
idea is that people have certain rights-a measure of freedom from 
government restraint of thought and action. People disagree about 
the scope of these rights. In this article, I posit a degree of individual 
autonomy broad enough to satisfy almost everyone. First, it is agreed 
that individuals have a "right to moral independence."18 Government 
may forbid only acts that cause fairly direct, concrete harm to others.19 
This pJiinciple is invoked to challenge, for example, laws against 
14 See Wardle, supra note 10, 29 FAM. L. Q. at 509-11. 
15 See Baehr, supra note 2. 
16 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) .  
1 7  For arguments i n  favor a heightened level of judicial review, see Elvia R Arriola, Sexual 
Identity and the Constitution: Homose:xual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S 
RIGHTS L. REP. 263, 272-78 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Histmy of Same-Sex Maniage, 79 
VA. L. REV. 1419, 1425 n.13 (1993). For contrary arguments, see Richard F. Duncan, Who 
Wants To Stop The Chunh: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, And Religious Freedom, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 407-11 (1994); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional 
Claims for Same-Sex Mmriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 88-95 (1996). 
18 RONALD DWORKJN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 353 (1985) . 
19 The classic source of the "harm" principle is Mill. See JOHN S. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF 
WOMEN (1869);JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTI (1859). However, the principle is questioned even 
by many liberals who endorse the norm of moral independence. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social 
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 947-48 (1996) ("[o]bstacles to autonomy and to 
good lives can . . .  come from bad roles, norms, and meanings" which "sometimes private 
groups are unable to . . .  change on their own," so that government must shape norms so as to 
nurture autonomy) . 
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sodomy and abortion. The Supreme Court has sustained some of these 
challenges,20 but even a challenge that fails in court may succeed in the 
legislative arena. Thus, although the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of criminal sodomy Iaws,21 most states have repealed 
these laws in the belief that homosexual acts in private between 
consenting adults do not harm others and should not be forbidden 
simply because a majority of citizens may consider the conduct 
unnatural, disgusting, immoral or sinful. 22 
The legitimate scope of law-making is broader in what Cass Sunstein 
calls the "expressive" function of the law, that is, "in expressing social 
values and in encouraging social norms to move in particular 
directions."23 Despite some reckless claims that the liberal state must 
be value-neutral,24 thoughtful commentators recognize that govern­
ment may promote certain values and discourage others.25 Indeed, it 
could hardly do otherwise. Virtually all law-making reflects value judg­
ments, many of which are controversial;26 to concede a sphere of 
20 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
21 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia criminal sodomy 
statute). 
22 See ES!ill!DGE, supm note 9, at 135: "Only twenty states have fully enforceable laws 
prohibiting consensual sodomy." Further, "sodomy laws are almost never enforced against 
lesbians, bisexuals, or gay men within private spaces." Jd. at 184. 
23 Sunstein, supra note 18, at 953. See also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 
62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. 
L REv. 2021 (1996). This function is important to family law. See Carol Weisbrod, On the 
Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991 (1989). 
24 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL jUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980) ("No reason [for 
exercising power] is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert ... that his concep­
tion of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens."); sec also DWORJUN, 
supra note 17, at 191 ("[P]olitical decisions must be, so as far as is possible, independent of any 
particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life."). More considered state­
ments by Professor Dworkin contradict these passages. See in fin note 28. 
25 In A Theo1y of justice, perhaps the most influential liberal statement on legitimacy, john 
Rawls accepts the need for "some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the par­
ties' motives in the original position." jOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF jUSTICE 396 (1971 ). See also 
Michael J. Perry, The Momlity of Homosexual Conduct: A Response tofolm Finn is, 9 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 41, 43 (1995): "[E]ven if the state cannot legitimately criminalize 
some particular conduct, it may nonetheless be the case that the state can legitimately judge 
the conduct to be immoral and, on the basis of that judgment, try to discourage tl1e conduct or 
to protect others from it." 
26 "[G]overnments must inevitably act on the basis of some controversial conception of the 
human good . ... " ROBERT P. GEORGE, MA!UNG MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC 
MORALilY (1993) at 162. 
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individuai autonomy is itself a value judgment.27 The expressive 
function is especially important in family law, which serves "both as a 
mechanism for meeting the needs of family members and as a vehicle 
for expressing our values and aspirations about family life to ourselves 
and our children."28 Thus the state may favor certain conduct, for 
instance by subsidizing education in some areas but not in others, even 
though some people dislike the state's choices. The state may also dis­
courage activities (such as smoking, drinking and gambling) both by 
taxation and exhortation, even if the state could not forbid these 
activities. As these examples suggest, govemment may promote (or 
discourage) conduct because it believes that the conduct benefits (or 
harms) the individual, even if the individual does not agree.29 The ex­
pressive function of law is important because the social norms it fosters 
encourage good behavior; without this effect, coercion or economic 
pressure might be needed to induce desirable behavior.30 
Legal preferences concerning material interests, like health and 
wealth, provoke little opposition. May government also promote (or 
deter) activity that it believes is spiritually enriching (or da.TTiaging)? 
For some libertarians, spiritual enlightenment, or happiness, is a 
private matter in which the state should not interfere, especially when 
people disagree about what increases true happiness. However, virtu­
ally all societies, including ours, accept that government may promote 
spiritual well-being. Thus the state promotes the arts through public 
schooling, tax deductions for gifts to the arts, official acclaim (such as 
naming a poet laureate), subsidies for artistic activity, and beautifi­
cation of public works. These efforts are accepted even though they 
do not improve public health or increase economic output. Moreover, 
the scope of proper state action is broader for children than for adults 
because children are less able to determine and protect their own 
interests. Thus the state may mandate schooling and medical care for 
children even when it could not do so for adults. 
27 See id. at 158. 
28 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault 
Era, 82 GEO. LJ. 2525,2526 (1994).  
29 Thus even Ronald Dworkin supports seat-belt laws on the ground that they give people 
what they really want rather than overriding their true desires. Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of 
a Liberal Equality, in 11 TANNER LECfURES ON HUMAN VALUES 77 (Grethe B. Peterson ed. 1990). 
30 See WILlARD GAYLIN & BRUCE jENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OF AUTONOMY 185 (1996) 
(appeals to social emotions are less oppressive than physical force); Sunstein, supra note 18, at 
918 & n. 51, 955. 
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There is some tension between the liberal principles of democracy 
and individual autonomy. To thrive as a free person one needs certain 
attributes, including the skills necessary to earn a decent income, 
sufficient education to participate intelligently in public affairs, and a 
moral character strong enough to exercise one's autonomy to fashion 
a satisfYing life. Democracy cannot prosper unless most citizens 
possess these attributes. The growing complexity of modern life 
demands more of these attributes for both individuals and society as a 
whole to flourish. People do not automatically acquire these qualities, 
though. The problems underdeveloped countries face in building 
democracy and economic prosperity show both the impossibility of 
achieving these goals without a populace that is adequately prepared 
and the difficulty of developing such a populace. Thus; ironically, an 
active government is necessary to nurture the kind of citizenry that can 
flourish under limited (or liberal) government and make that 
government work. 
Even in its expressive functions, though, the state should not 
embrace values arbitrarily. As Dworkin puts it: "People have the right 
not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of social goods and 
opportunities . . . just on the ground that their officials or fellow­
citizens think that their opinions about the right way for them to lead 
their own lives are ignoble or wrong."31 Similarly, Cass Sunstein says: 
"without very good reasons, social and legal structures ought not to 
tum differences that are irrelevant from the moral point of view into 
social disadvantages."32 As Sunstein implies, moral considerations are 
appropriate in law-making, but the majority is not right simply because 
it is the majority. 
The most influential statement of the liberal theory of justice comes 
from John Rawls. Rawls says justice demands rules that are fair in that 
they would be acceptable to persons in the "original position"-that is, 
without such particular features as wealth, race, sex, sexual orientation, 
and family status, that can lead to support for rules that favor one's 
own interests over others' interests.33 Although Rawls has many 
critics,34 this article accepts his principle. We may even extend Sun-
31 DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 353. 
32 Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. LJ. 1, 13 (1994). 
33 RAWLS, supra note 24, at 11-17, 136-42. 
34 E.g., R.M. Hare, Rawls' Themy of Justice: Part II, 23 PHIL. Q. (SCOT.) 241 (1973); Russell 
Hittinger, John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 47 REV. METAPHYSICS 585 (1994); Douglas B. 
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stein's proposition and insist that, even where there are morally rele­
vant differences, the legal consequences of those differences should be 
reasonable, not excessive. Thus, even if there is a valid basis for the 
law to favor traditional over same-sex marriage, defenders of the law 
should still explain why this disparate legal treatment is not dispro­
porti�mate. 
This does not mean that defenders of a promotional (as opposed to 
a prohibitory) law bear a heavy burden of proving the practical 
benefits of a .law or of alternatives to it, especially if the law touches 
matters of great social concern and the alternatives are untested. The 
20th century is littered with the ruins of grandiose social schemes that 
were earnestly promoted by intelligent people promising great 
benefits but that ultimately inflicted terrible damage. Experience 
proves the iron law of unintended consequences-new laws may or 
may not achieve their intended results, but they always produce 
unexpected results.35 Human society is too complex and too poorly 
understood to permit confident predictions of the effects of significant 
legal change. A democracy may choose to experiment on itself, but it 
need not do so. Defenders of traditional laws may justly demand 
caution and convincing evidence that change will at least not make 
matters worse.36 Tradition should not be followed blindly, but it 
deserves respect and may be properly maintained in case of doubt, 
especially concerning acts traditionally considered repugnant.37 
Because marriage and the family are entwined with religion in 
Western (and most other) civilizations, the role of religion in law­
making must be addressed. America, like many liberal states, forbids 
establishment of religion,38 but all law rests on norms that are not 
Rasmussen, A Critique of Rawls' Theory of justice, 55 PERSONALIST 303 (1974). 
35 Even a liberal like Isaiah Berlin championed our "common sense beliefs, which at least 
have the merit of having been tested by long experience, " over theories lacking empirical 
support. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 32 (1953). 
36 See David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 15, 45-46 (1996) (noting many unanswered questions about homosexual marriage and 
arguing for "the legal system treading very carefully until some of the answers to those 
questions emerge from the research currently under way"). 
37 Physician and philosopher Leon Kass argues that our feelings of repugnance should be 
given weight in public policy: "in this age . . .  repugnance may be the only voice that speaks up 
to defend the central core of our humanity. " Leon R. Kass, The WISdom of Repugnance, NEW 
REPUBLIC, june 2, 1997, at 20. 
38 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. " U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
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empi1ically verifiable.39 A law is not invalid simply because the values it 
expresses stem from religion if those values are accessible to con­
ventional secular thought.'10 Indeed, the liberal notion of human 
rights originated from religion, as evidenced by the statement in the 
Declaration of Independence: "We hold these Truths to be self­
evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights."41 The abolition of slavery, 
for example, is not illegitimate just because it sprang from a belief that 
slavery is offensive to God. The same is true of arguments for gay 
rights, which are often based on religion.42 
Western marriage laws grew out of and still largely reflect Christian 
beliefs,'13 but these laws do not establish religion-they neither 
command nor promote Christian faith or practices. Moreover, as this 
article shows, traditional maniage laws can be justified on exclusively 
secular grounds. 
III. F.A.LSE JUST!FICATIONS OF MY..JUUAGE 
Many justifications have been offered for legal recognition of 
marriage, but not all of them are persuasive. 
A. To Encourage Stable, Loving Relationships 
Some argue that love is the only valid requisite for maniage:H This 
claim is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because many 
loving relationships are considered improper for marriage. Love takes 
39 Both religious and secular moralists ultimately founct their views on faith. See RlCHARD 
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORALANDLEGAL THEORY (1999). 
40 Laws that do not compel or even encourage adherence to some religion can still be 
hard to justify on secular grounds. Thus forbidding consumption of meat on Fridays (as the 
Catholic Church once did) or consumption of pork (as Islam and judaism do) would be hard 
to vindicate in secular terms even though those rules do not compel or encourage adherence 
to any religion . 
.Jl T I-lE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
42 See Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" CanaTd in lhe Debale Over Lesbian and Gay 
Civil Righls, 9 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHIGS & PUB. POL'Y 137, 166 (1995) ("basic religious tenets . . .  
mj;port the cause of barring discrimination on Lhe basis of sexual orientation") (emphasis in 
original ) .  
43 The qualification "largely" i s  needed because Christian beliefs vary among 
denominations and change within denominations over time. For example, our laws permit 
divorce, which most Protestant sects allow but which the Roman Catholic Church opposes. 
44 See Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Mania.ge and lhe Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural, 
Canonical, and Naluml Law Based Definitions of Maniage, 35 HOWARD LJ. 1 73, 222-23 (1991). 
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many forms. C.S. Lewis distinguished family love, affection, erotic 
desire, friendship, and compassion.45 All can be good, but compassion 
is not deemed a basis for marriage. Close relatives often love each 
other but cannot marry.46 One who is married may love a third party 
more than one's spouse, but one cannot marry the third party.47 
Children can love but cannot marry. Many people love pets, but they 
cannot marry them. Hence, homosexual love is not the only love 
ineligible for marriage. Indeed, many forms of sexual love, such as 
pederasty, adultery, bestiality and incest, are criminal even in states 
that permit homosexual acts. 48 
This justification is also too narrow because love is not necessary for 
marriage. Love was long considered unimportant to marriage in the 
West, and still is in many non-Western societies.49 Marriage exists in 
part-especially in some traditions-to provide for rearing children 
and for certain kinds of care and support between wife and husband. 5° 
Even in liberal states Jove is never a precondition to marriage, nor 
does its absence invalidate a marriage. 51 Most marriages were once ar­
ranged by parents; Lhe couple might never see each other before the 
wedding.52 Even in liberal societies many would consider a marriage 
successful despite the absence of romantic love if the couple treat each 
other with care, kindness and respect. In sum, love is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for a socially or legally acceptable 
marriage. 
45 C.S. LEWIS, THE FOUR LOVES (1960). 
46 See infra. notes 253-64 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 239-52 and accompanying text. 
48 See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 150 (3d ed. 1995) (in half the states 
adultery is still a crime). 
49 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 471-74 (1995). See also Margaret F. Brinig 
& Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23]. LEGAL STUD. 869, 875 (1994) ("Although 
affection might grow out of long and close association between the spouses, it was by no means 
necessary for the practical purposes of marriage."). But see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIAGE AND 
THE FAMILY 431 (1995) (stating that North Americans view love as the basis for marriage and as 
important to its continuation). 
50 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 472 (1995 ). 
51 Jd .. 
52 See id. at 473 ( "Arranged marriages are the norm in many parts of the world. " ). 
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B. Legal Benefits of Marriage 
Some say it is unfair to deny gays the legal benefits of marriage. 53 If 
so, however, it is also wrong to withhold these benefits from unmarried 
people, and we should not validate gay marriages but eliminate the 
legal benefits of marriage, as some propose.54 Some private and public 
employers now grant domestic partners (usually including but not 
limited to gay partners) of employees benefits which were traditionally 
limited to spouses.55 Such changes do not necessitate changing the 
legal definition of marriage. 
The tangible benefits of marriage do not interest most advocates of 
gay maniage.56 This is not surprising. The law confers some 1uaterial 
benefits on marriage, such as special tax treatment and coverage for 
spouses under some social welfare programs (like Social Security). 
These benefits are minor, though; most couples hardly consider Lhem 
in deciding whether to marry. Marriage also incurs legal detriments, 
such as higher tax rates on two-earner couples, that often outweigh the 
benefits. 57 The law also sets legal rights of married people regarding 
child custody, division of assets, and right to support. These rights can 
be imporL:"1nt after marriage, but they rarely provide an incentive to 
wed, primarily because they are a zero-sum game-the right of one 
spouse is the disability of the other. It is no surp1ise, Lhen, that few 
gays bother to utilize laws recognizing domestic partners.58 
53 See ESKRIDGE, supm note 9, at 66-74. 
54 See MARTHA FINE!v!AN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-30 (1995); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get "What We Ash For: 
vt?,y Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Jvlaniage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Eve�y 
hJaniage, 1179 VA. L. REv. 1535, 1549 (1993) ("AdvocaLing lesbian and gay marriage 1viH detract 
from, even contradict, efforts to unhook economic benefits from marriage and make basic 
health care and other necessities available to all."). 
55 See supm note 14. 
56 See Chambers, supm note 1, at 450 ("[F]ew advocates [of gay marriage] address at any 
length the legal consequences of marriage"). 
57 See james Aim & Leslie A Whittington, For Love or Morny? The Impact of Taxes on Maniage, 
66 ECONOMICA 297 (1999) (marriage penalty tax reduces the marriage rate); Richard L. 
Elbert, Love, God, and Country: Religious Freedom and the Mmriage Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL 
CONST. LJ. 1171, 1174-85 (1995) (describing history and status of the penalty); Richard B. 
Malamud, Allocation of the joint &tum lvlarriage Penalty and Bonus, 15 VA. TA .. X REV. 489 (1996); 
C. Eugene Steuerle, \faluing Marital Commitment: The Radical RestmctU7ing of our Tax and 
Transfer Systems, 9 RESPONSIVE COMMUN. 35 (1999) (finding an "extraordinary array of marriage 
[tax] penalties"). 
58 By the end of 1997 fewer than 300 couples had registered, and about 25% of these were 
siblings or elderly parents and adult children. See Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Finds Slow Response to 
Domestic Pmtners Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 28, 1997, at AS, available in 1997 WL 
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Proponents of gay maniage care not about the material benefits it 
would bring but about its social acceptance as equal to traditional mar­
riage. 59 
C. Religious Rationales 
Marriage has religious significance in Western and most other 
cultures. Basing the legal definition of maniage on religion would not 
breach the Constitution's Establishment Clause because it does not 
endorse or compel obeaience to any faith, but religion alone cannot 
justify law in a liberal state. 60 
IV. VALID ARGUMENTS FOR TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE 
All societies celebrate maniage. Weddings typically feature 
elaborate rituals (usually religious) and festivities.61 Marriage also has 
major legal consequences in all cultures.62 Most religions venerate 
maniage, but even atheists must be struck by the prestige universally 
conferred upon maniage. The only event generally deemed more 
important is the installation of a new ruler. There must be powerful 
global reasons for this special treatment. 
A. Child Rearing 
1. The Importance of Marriage to Child-Rearing 
The primary social function of maniage is rearing children. 
Christianity has long recognized this. The medieval jurist Gratian 
considered offspring the purpose of marriage.63 The first English 
16187525. 
59 See supra note l. 
60 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Right to Death, NEWYORJ{ REV. BOOKS, Jan. 31, 1991, at 14, 
17 (" [T] he Constitution does not allow states to justify policy on grounds of religious doc­
trine") . See a./so supra text accompanying notes 38-41 (values underlying law should be 
accessible to secular thought). 
61 See Chambers, supra note 1, at 450 ("In our country, as in most societies throughout the 
world, marriage is the single most significant communal ceremony of belonging. It marks not 
just a joining of two people, but a joining offamilies and an occasion for tifbal celebration and 
solidarity.") 
62 See I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 182-87 (1995) (concerning divorce); II 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 442-47, 562-65 (1995) (concerning consequences 
of marriage for property ownership and related issues) . 
63 See John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic 
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Book of Common Prayer listed Lhe rearing of children as the first 
reason for marriage.64 A. fter the decision in Baehr favoring gay 
marriage, the Hawaii legislature resolved that marriage is "intended to 
foster and protect the propagation of the human race."65 Government 
efforts to provide comprehensive child care have never succeeded;66 in 
every society today child-rearing is performed primarily by parents. 
Government programs can help children but can never substitute for 
good parents. 57 
In the middle of this century America gradually forgot the impor­
tance of traditional marriage to children. Illegitimacy and divorce 
("broken families") had been rare, so their effects on children were 
often considered minor and ascribed to causes (like poverty) other 
than family structure. The explosion of bastardy_ and divorce in the 
last thirty years prompted closer inquiry, which revived appreciation of 
the importance of marriage to children. Under every standard­
educational achievement, drug use, criminal activity, physical and 
emotional health, social adjustment and adult earnings-children of 
intact marriages have fewer problems than children of broken fa_mi­
lies.68 Other causes, like poverty, add to childhood problems, but 
"[c]hildren in one-parent families are much worse off than those in 
two-parent families even when both families have t11e same earnings."69 
Moreover, other causes (like poverty) are not wholly separate but stem 
partly from marital failure.70 
Theologians and Canonists 174, 289 (1966); Genital Good, 8 COMMUNIO 198, 214 (1981) 
64 The other two reasons were to avoid the sin of fornication and to encourage couples to 
provide "mutual society, help and comfort." Noll, su.pra note 9, at 41-42. 
65 Act of June 22, 1994, No. 217, § I, 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217, -reprinted in 20 FAJ<l. L. REP. 
2013, 2015 (1994). 
66 Even the most promising attempt-the communal raising of children in Israeli 
kibbutzim-has been largely abandoned. See Karl Zinmeister, Actually, Villages A-re Lonsy at 
Raising Pm-Sclwol Children, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, May/June 1996, at 52, 54 (in nearly all 
kibbutzim "[i] nfant care has shifted back to parents"). 
67 See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 1993, at 
47, 48 ("If we fail to come to terms with the relationship between family structure and 
declining child well-being, then it will be increasingly difficult to improve children's life 
prospects, no matter how many new programs the federal government funds."). 
68 See generally William Galston, A Liberal-Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family, 
RESPONSrvE COMMUNITY, Winter 1990-91, 14-26. 
69 James Q. Wilson, Hu.ma.n. Remedies for Social Disorders, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1998, at 25, 
27-28. See also SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: 
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994). 
70 Sa infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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When one parent is absent, it is usually the father. The father's 
absence from the home is damaging to children.71 Unwed fathers can 
be diligent but in practice rarely are: "All available evidence suggests 
that the most effective pathway to involved, committed, and 
responsible fatherhood is marriage."72 Not only do children need two 
parents; it also seems that ideally a child should have both a mother 
and a father.73 Some claim that same-sex couples can serve equally 
well as parents. Studies of children raised by gay parents are inconclu­
sive, partly because samples have been so smal1.74 Absent firmer 
empirical evidence, it is reasonable to assume that children with both a 
mother and a father will learn better how to live in a world composed 
of males and females. 75 
Although marriage involves an agreement between two people, it is 
not governed by general contract law. "[M]any of the terms of the 
marriage are prescribed by the state, not to be varied by the parties' 
private agreements."76 The special treatment of marriage is justified by 
the presence of children: young children and children yet unborn 
cannot negotiate for themselves, so the state protects them by 
imposing contract terms on the parents.77 Further, one spouse (usu­
ally the wife) often makes "significant and specific investments: 
contributions of time and energy and money, to each other and to 
their children, that may not see fruition for many years and tl1at may 
71 Wade F. Hom & Andrew Bush, Fathers and Welfare Reform, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1997, at 
38, 39. 
72 Id, at 41. 
73 See ELISABETH BADINTER, XY: ON MAsCULINE IDENTI1Y 43-66 (Lydia Davis, trans., 
Columbia University Press lst ed. 1995) (1992); DAVID POPENOE, LiFE WITHOUT FATHER 139-
190 (1996); MARY STEWART VAN LEEUWEN, GENDER AND GRACE (1990); Mary Stewart Van 
Leeuwen, Opposite Sexes Or Neighbming Sexes ? The Importance of Gender in the Welfa·re Responsibility 
Debate, in WELFARE IN AMERICA 243, 243-74 (Stanley W. Carlson-Thies & James W. Skillen eds., 
1996); Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen, To Ask a Better Question: The Heterosexuality-Homosexuality 
Debate Revisited, in INTERPRETATION (forthcoming); Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 10, at 
857-64 (discussing the importance to children of having both a mother and a father). 
74 See infra note 104. 
75 See ELIZABETH MOBERLY, PSYCHOGENESIS: THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER IDENTI1Y 
79 (1983) (ascribing homosexuality primarily to a child's inability to identify with the parental 
figure of the same sex). Presumably, this is more likely to happen if a child has no parent of 
the same sex. This proposition does not require any assumption of significant innate behavior­
al differences between women and men. Even if the differences are socially determined, 
children must learn to live with them. 
76 Brinig & Crafton, supm note 48, at 870. 
77 See Gary Becker & Kevin Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. & ECON. I, 3-5 (1988). 
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b e  worthless if the relationship does not endure."78 But Lhe marriage 
relationship is "so complex that any attempt to specify in detail all of its 
terms would be futile as well as perhaps destructive. "79 
Since gay couples cannot reproduce, these considerations would 
not apply to gay marriages. Recognition of gay marriages would 
inevitably lead to efforts to relax the mandatory contract terms 
designed for traditional marriages with children.80 To treat gay 
m arriages differently would violate the notion that gay marriages are 
fundamentally the same as traditional marriages.81 Some compromise 
would be likely, but any compromise would impair the suitability of 
mmital law for traditional couples. 
Although some dismiss the traditional family as an anachronism, a 
vestige, a historical relic, the opposite is tme-the traditional f<U-nily is 
m ore essen tial now Lhan ever. In order to thrive the modern, liberal, 
capitalist democracy needs citizens with higher j ob skills, education, 
and moral character than pre-modem or undemocratic societies. 
These qualities are best cultivated in the traditional family; indeed, no 
socieLy has developed such a citizenry except through the tradi tional 
family. A cohesive community can compensate in part for paren t's 
shortcomings, but in the mobile, atomized modern world tight-knit 
communities are rare. Thus "the family, and specifically the bourgeois 
family, is the necessary social context for the emergence of the auton­
omous individuals who are the empirical foundation of poli tical 
democracy. "82 
When people were few, procreation was encouraged to h elp each 
78 Brinig & Crafton, supt-a note 48, at 871 . 
79 !d. at 870-71 .  
80 Many proponents of gay m arriage already advocate changing marriage laws in many 
ways. See infra n o tes 174-80 and accompanying text. Many also support more relaxed ani tudes 
toward adultery and divorce. See infra notes 224-36 and accompanying text. 
81 l t  would be unwise t o  distinguish marriages b y  t h e  "neutral" criterion o f  wheth e r  a 
couple has children. One spouse often makes an investm e n t  in the marriage prior to and in 
anticipation of having children. For example, if a couple plans to have children and to have 
the wife care for them in infancy, she may work rather than expand her education, then bank 
her earnings and saved tuition. If this couple divorces, even before having children, the set­
tlement should take this con tribution into account. For a gay couple, though, this reasoning 
would not apply. 
82 BIUGIITE & PETER BERGER, THE WAR OVER THE FAMILY: CAPTURING THE MIDDLE GROUND 
172 (1984) (emphasis omi tted) .  See also GAYUN & JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 103 ( " [M] arriage 
. . .  serve [s] to bind sexual desire to reproduction and child care. By destroying the conditions 
that support paren ting . . .  we would destroy the child-and not only the child, but the socie ty 
that will later be shaped by those parentless children, will suffer." ) .  
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tribe and humanity in general to survive. Underpopulation is rarely a 
problem today.83 However, with fertility below replacement level in 
most developed countries, marriage with children may cease to be the 
norm. The concern for others that matures through bearing and rais­
ing children could then give way to hedonism and narcissism.84 
Society may properly avoid this by favoring traditional marriage. 
Traditional marriage is not incompatible with contraception, as 
claimed by some natural law scholars. 85 Contracepted sex can tighten 
a marriage while delaying conception until the couple is ready to care 
properly for children. 86 It can also prevent the conception of more 
children than the couple can adequately care for. Thus contraception 
can assist good parenting� 
2. Marital Cohesion Affects All of Society 
Hillary Clinton reminded America of the forgotten truth that it 
takes a village to raise a child.87 " [S]ociety requires a critical mass of 
married, two-parent families, both to raise their own children well and 
to serve as models for those who are being reared outside of the 
'conventional' family."88 If broken families are few, their children still 
have many models of intact families (among relatives and neighbors, 
for example) to show them that this is the norm, what is expected of 
them, and to teach them what it means to be part of an intact family. 
It is hard for a child to learn how to be a good spouse and parent when 
he sees few examples around him. 
Similarly, when the children of broken families are few, the 
misconduct to which they are prone is the exception. The majority in 
intact families set a standard that children from broken families tend 
83 Low population is a problem for some groups, though. For example, the low birth rate 
of American Jews combined with their ' high rate of intermarriage with non:Jews in a growing 
population makes some worry that there could eventually be too few Americans with a Jewish 
identity to constitute a viable community. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE VANISHING AMERICAN 
JEW 1-2, 24-32 (1997) (giving statistics on the declining number of American Jews). 
84 See infra text accompanying notes 113-15. 
85 See John M. Finnis, Law, Marality, and "Sexual Orientation, " 9 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL'Y 11, 30-31 (1995). 
86 See Perry, supra note 24, at 50. 
87 HIUARYRODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE (1996). 
88 Hom & Bush, supra note 70, at 42. See also WIWAM A GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 285 
(1991) (arguing family structure is not solely a private matter because it affects the stability of 
families generally). See also AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 248 (1993) ("To shore 
up the moral foundations of our society, we start with the family"). 
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to follow because children are even more loathe Lhan adults to be 
different. If children from broken families predominate, though, they 
set a standard which other children tend to follow. In sum, if most 
children come from intact families, they pull up the behavior of other 
children; when m ost children come from broken families, they pull 
down the behavior of others. 
More broadly, traditional marriage is inextricably tied to our 
concern for future generations and for the welfare of o thers. Concern 
for others is not innate-an infant cares only about i tself, not  others. 
Altmisrn is not  learned primarily in formal schooling but by experi­
ence acquired in part in our own families-first as children of our 
paren ts, then as spouses and as parents of our children.89 We also 
learn from our social milieu; we l earn benevolence in a community 
where marrying and raising children is normal. To care for our ovvn 
children-their schools, their safety, their socialization into the 
community-we must to some extent care for others. Moreover, al­
though we are mortal, unaffected by events after we die, to care for our 
children we must care about the future world in which they will live 
after we die. 
Altruism is often fragmentary; we may prefer ourselves to our 
children, our children to our neighbors, and our neighbors to 
strangers. But even partial altruism is an importan t social adhesive, 
and it can be augmented by more abstract concepts of benevolence, 
such as the Christian command to love not only those closest to us but 
all humanity, even our enemies. Thus the family provides both the 
li teral nursery for our children and the metaphoric nursery of the 
family of man .  
If the traditional family ceases to be the norm , al LTUism will erode.90 
In every society some people do not or cannot marry and bear and 
raise children. If they are viewed as unfortunate exceptions, the norm 
is not impaired. Recognition of gay marriages would mutilate the 
norm by granting, for the first time in history, equal honor to 
partnerships that inherently exclude tl1e creation of life. The impact 
would be greater if, as seems likely, few gays elected to marry, stay 
89 See infra notes 1 13-19 and accompanying text (traditional marriage socializes adults, 
especially men, but same-sex marriage would not do so). 
90 See Gaylin & Jennings, supm note 29, at 114-19 (describing the profound influence of 
parents on the moral development of children). See also iufra note 114 (marriage teaches "the 
acceptance of responsibilities we have not willed or chosen"). 
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married, and adopted children.91 Like legalizing bestiality, cloning, 
and baby-selling,92 validation of gay marriage would not cause direct, 
proximate harm, but it would damage society by degrading the way we 
see and relate to others. Traditional marriage is a public good. That 
is, it benefits not only married couples and their children but also 
generates positive externalities, or benefits to others. Men and women 
who marry and stay married encourage others to do likewise, to the 
profit of society. 
Judaism and Christianity are unusual in their reverence for the 
family and condemnation of polygamy and homosexuality.93 The 
ascendancy of Western civilization in the last 500 years may stem in 
part from this attitude. By nurturing the institution that best instills 
bourgeois values, Judaism and Christianity made possible the 
economic and technological progress of the West. Some of the 
harsher aspects of this attitude, such as criminalization of sodomy, may 
be unnecessary, but retaining reverence for the family may be essential 
to preserving and extending this progress. 
3. Marriage Needs Society 's Support 
Unfortunately, marriages do not always occur and endure without 
encouragement from society. Raising children is one of the m ost 
difficult and demanding jobs human beings undertake. The 
temptation to shirk this task is especially strong in the modern world. 
In the past the monetary cost of raising children was low, limited 
primarily to simple food and clothing. Most people were farmers for 
whom children earned their keep from an early age by helping with 
farm work. Adult children supported parents grown too old for 
laborious farm work. Modern societies need parents to give children 
much more, including expensive, long-term schooling and health 
care. Today, few children can help with their parents' jobs. The 
opportunity costs of children are also higher for modem bourgeois 
couples who, unlike poor farmers, can devote available time to earning 
money at high rates or to innumerable leisure activities. Caring for 
children reduces time available for these pursuits. Finally, child 
91 See supra note 57 (few gays have used domestic partnership Jaws); infra notes 230 & 306 
(instability of most gay male relationships). 
92 See infra notes 265-84 and accompanying text. 
93 See Sheryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 301, 308 & n.32 (1984). 
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rearing is often unpleasant and emotionally draining. Not surpris­
ingly, then, parents are sometimes tempted to neglect their children 's 
needs. 
Despite the burdens of child-rearing, many people m ake ex­
traordinary efforts to have and care for children. Many couples 
endure great expense, physical pain, emotional trauma, and 
humiliation in trying to conceive a baby. Others battle repeated 
obstacles to adopt a child. The high cost of giving children good care 
is paid not only by people who can easily afford it but also by many 
who are less wealthy and for whom tl1e cost requires great sacrifice. 
Many parents absorb the unusual costs of children with disabilities, 
medical problems, or other special needs. 
Regrettably, modem l ife often hinders good parenting. Market 
economies encourage material consumption by ubiqui tous advertising 
and exhortati ons to self-gratification. The support for parenting long 
provided by religion is corroded by widespread secularism . Marriage 
and the family are denigrated by elites,94 educators95 and gay activists.96 
The state helps parents by providing services (like public schools) and 
subsidies (like tax credits and deductions) for chil dren, and surely 
more could be done, but tl1e state can never fully compensate the 
work good parents do. However, the state can encourage and support 
parents by recognizing and honoring maniage as the insti tution that 
best facilitates good parenting.97 
It is not enough for society to applaud marriage wi thout reference 
to the purpose of raising children . Indiscriminate applause could 
suggest that m arriage exists to m aximize self-gratification and should, 
tl1erefore , be dissolved when it :no longer seems to serve that pt!11)0Se, 
94 First Lady Hillary Clinton once compared marriage to slavery. Hil lary Rodham, Chi!dTcn 
Uuder the Law, 43 HAIN. EDUC. REV. 487, 493 (1973). 
95 See Tamar Lewin, St-udy Criticizes Textbool!s on Marriage os Pessimistic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
1997, at A5, describing a study that concludes: "College student.s are being taught a pessimistic 
and sometimes inaccurate view of marriage, with great empha>is on issues like divorce and 
domestic violence, and little attention to the benefit.s of marriage, particularly for child-rearing 
96 See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text. 
97 See FRANCIS FUKUYA!v!A, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND TI-lE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 5 
(1995): 
A strong and stable family structure and durable social insti tutions cannot be legislated 
into existence . . . . A thriving civil society depends on a people's habits, customs, and ethics­
attributes that can be shaped only indirectly through conscious political action and must 
otherwise be nourished through an increased awareness and respect for culture. 
1 999] The Defense of Traditional Marriage 601 
especially when the going gets rough. Child-rearing always has rough 
periods; that's precisely when society's help is most needed to keep par­
ents together. What is wanted, then, is a buttress applied at this point 
of greatest stress; that is, an attitude that bolsters marriage as an institu­
tion for raising children. As social esteem for marriage and parenting 
declines, so does citizens' willingness to assume these roles.98 
Validation of same-sex marriages would accelerate this decline. 
Gay couples do not conceive, so of course advocates of gay marriage 
tend to ignore the connection of marriage with child rearing. More 
telling, when they do note the connection, its significance escapes 
them. For example, Andrew Koppelman notes "the resentment that 
those with familial responsibilities that weigh heavily upon them feel 
toward those who seem free of such responsibilities."99 Yet he then 
drops the point without considering that it might explain the need for 
society to celebrate traditional marriage.100 
4. The Significance of Childless Heterosexual Couples 
An objection to this justification of marriage is that heterosexual 
couples may marry even if they cannot or choose not to have chil­
dren.101 The argument is unpersuasive. First, society does not know 
which couples these are when they marry and could not even try to 
find out without incurring substantial government expense and 
unusual and offensive intrusion on their privacy.102 Second, condi-
98 Between 1957 and 1976 the "proportion of working men who found marriage and 
children burdensome and restrictive more than doubled." Whitehead, supra note 66, at 58. 
99 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LA W AND SOCIAL EQUAL11Y 173 (1996). 
100 Andrew Sullivan acknowledges 
a difference that [he thinks] is inherent between homosexual and 
heterosexual adults [is that] . . .  [t]he latter group is committed to the 
procreation of a new generation. The former simply isn't. . . .  The 
timeless, necessary, procreative unity of a man and a woman is inherently 
denied to homosexuals; and the way in which . . .  parenthood transforms 
their relationship, is far less common among homosexuals than among 
heterosexuals. 
ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 196 (1995). 
Paula Ettelbrick concedes that the "origins of marriage are deeply imbedded in procreation 
and the two-parent family" and homosexual "family structures will never fit the heterosexual 
model. " Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 
J.L & POL 'Y 107, 160 (1996). 
101 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 96; Mohr, supm note 6, at 223; SULLIVAN, supm note 100, 
at 179 (1995); Sunstein, supra note 31, at 6. 
102 See Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Manio.ge and the Myth of Tolerance: Is Cm·dinal 
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tions existing at the time of marriage may later change. Couples who 
do not want to bear children may change their minds. Couples who 
think they cannot bear children may prove wrong or, by medical help, 
become able to bear children. By contrast, we know without intrusion 
that same-sex couples are sterile and will remain so. Third, sterile 
couples can adopt. Same-sex couples can also adopt if the law permits, 
but there is considerable controversy about the effect on children 
being raised by a homosexual couple.103 Finally, even heterosexual 
couples that do not bear children reinforce the model of traditional 
marriage.104 
Exceptions do not invalidate a norm or the necessity of norms. 
How some individuals make use of marriage, either volitionally or as 
the result of some incapacity, does not determine the purpose of that 
institution. In that context, heterosexual sterility does not contradict 
the meaning of marriage in the way same-sex unions would.105 
Childless marriages are imperfect models, but no marriage is a 
Platonic ideal. By upholding marriage as a social norm, childless 
couples encourage others to foBow that norm, including couples who 
might otherwise have illegitimate children. 
Similarly, childless marriages may discourage divorce among cou­
ples with children. Childless couples have been respected for 
centuries. Many medieval theologians were hostile to sex and barely 
tolerated marriage as an inferior but, because of human frailty, neces­
sary alternative to chastity. In St. Paul's words, "It is better to marry 
than to burn with passion."106 Still, they uniformly acknowledged the 
validity of childless marriages and of sex within those marriages. 107 
O'ConnoT a "Homophobe'?, 10 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 587, 597 { 1996) ("the state 
could not exclude infertile heterosexual couples from marriage without imposing onerous 
invasions of privacy") .  
103 Studies on gay parenting lack statistical validity. See Philip A. Belc�tro et aL, A Review of 
Data Based Studies Addressing the Ef ects of Homosexual Pm·en.ting on Children's Sexual and Social 
Functioning, 20]. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 105 (1993) ;  Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 10, at 
844-52. See also Wardle, id. at 852-57, describing some possible dangers of gay parenting. 
1 04 "Even marriages that do not give rise to children exist in accord with, rather than in 
opposition to, [the] heterosexual norm." The Homosexual Movement: A Response by the Rn.msey 
Colloquium, FIRST THINGS, March 1994, at 15,  18.  The Ramsey Colloquium "is a group of jewish 
and Christian theologians, ethicists, philosophers, and scholars that meets periodically to 
consider questions of morality, religion, and public life." ld. at 15. 
lOS Editmial, COMMONWEAL, May 1 7, 1996, at 6. 
106 I Corinthians 7:9. 
107 See VERN L. BULLOUGH & jAMES A. BRUNDAGE, SEXUAL PRACTICES AND THE MEDIEVAL 
CHURCH 65-66 ( 1982) (stating that Thomas Aquinas deemed intercourse natural and permissi-
1999] The Defense of Traditional Marriage 603 
This attitude persists today in the restrictions on divorce of childless 
couples.108 Iflove and protection of children were the only reasons for 
social concern about marriage, the law would require only mutual 
consent for the divorce of childless couples. Society has an interest, 
though, in preserving these marriages as images (albeit imperfect) of a 
social ideal and in discouraging the attitude that marriages may be 
quickly and casually dissolved.109 
Homosexual couples do not reinforce the model of traditional mar­
riage. They send conflicting signals to children who must decide how 
to live their lives in a confusing worldY0 This does not mean that 
legitimizing gay marriages would lure otherwise heterosexual children 
into homosexuality, although that might happen occasionally. Rather, 
validation of same-sex marnages would eviscerate society's 
endorsement of traditional marriagell l  and thereby suggest indiffer­
ence to illegitimacy, divorce, and child neglect. 
B. Socializing Adults 
Marriage channels potentially destructive energy into beneficial 
activity. As the Ramsey Colloquium says: "Marriage is a place where, in 
a singular manner, our waywardness begins to be healed and our fear 
of commitment overcome, where we may learn to place another per­
son's needs rather than our own desires at the center of life."1 1 2 As an 
editorial in the journal Commonweal stated: 
Is there really any doubt that in tying sexual attraction 
to love and love to children and the creation of fami­
lies, marriage fundamentally shapes our ideas of 
human dignity and the nature of society? Same-sex 
marriage, whatever its virtues, would narrow that frame 
ble for barren couples).  
108 Although most states no longer require fault for divorce, they still require a delay 
before divorce can be granted. See Annat., 62 AL.R.2d 1 262-65 ( 1 994) (describing state 
statutes requiring delay before divorce) . 
109 See Whitehead, supra. note 66, at 49 (asserting that liberal divorce laws undermine 
marriage generally by making divorce more socially acceptable ) .  
1 1 0  See Elizabeth Kristol, The Ma.nying Kind, FIRST THINGS, jan., 1 996, at 45, 46 (reviewing 
ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY ( 1995) ) .  
1 1 1  See infra. notes 200-10 and accompanying text (recognition of same-sex marriage would 
diminish esteem for marriage) .  
1 12  The Homosexual Movement A Response by the Ramsey Colloquium, supra. note 105, at 17. 
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and foreshorten our perspective. Marriage, at its best, 
tutors us as no other experience can in the given 
nature of human life and the acceptance of 
responsibilities we have not willed or chosen. 1 1 3 
In the mid-twentieth century Americans lost this truth. With peace 
and prosperity, most Americans thrived, and the interests of individual 
and society usually coincided. That is, most people prospered through 
education, work, marriage, sobriety, thrift, and obedience to law-ali 
values that benefit society generally. Those who divorced or never 
manied tended to suffer for it; they had greater problems with drug 
use, criminal activity, physical and emotional health, social adjustment 
and earning a living. 1 14 In short, it was in the interests of individuals to 
marry and to stay married, and most did. Those who did not were 
generally regarded as either victims of unfortunate circumstances or as 
losers. 
The breakdown of the family in Lhe last 25 years reminded us of the 
importance of marriage in socializin!l adults. As the number of 
• u � 
unmarried adults increased, so did the wayward conduct to which they 
are prone. The problem is greatest in inner cities ravaged by crime 
aJ1d dn1g abuse, mostly committed by unmarried men. Just as the 
breakdo-wn of the family has a cumulative effect on children that 
exceeds its arithmetic growth,1 15 so it also has a cumulative effect on 
adults. When bachelorhood was rare, adults were pressed to marry lest 
they be pitied or despised. That pressure has dissipated, and in some 
communities maniage is now so rare as to seem odd or even bizarre. 
As tJ1e resulting anti-social conduct proliferates, those who won1rl 
fonnerly have avoided such conduct because it was considered deviant 
or disgraceful are no longer deterred. 
There is also a negative synergy between tJ1e effects on children and 
on adults of the breakdown of u'le faxuily. Children of broken fatuilies 
1 1 3 Edit01ial, supm note 1 06, at 6. 
1 14 The pathology of bachelorhood is particularly striking for men. See GEORGE AKERLOF, 
MEN WITHOUT CHILDREN ( 1997) .  The study notes, for example, that the incarceration for 
young married men is 2.6 per thousand, compared with 1 7.6 per thousand young single men.  
Some believe that  men are genetically harder to socialize than women.  See Natalie Angier, 
Parental Origin oJChmmosome May Detennine Social Gmces, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, june 1 2, 1997, 
at A2 (reporting a study finding that girls lackin g  an X chromosome from their fathers were 
more anti-social; this suggests that the higher frequency of anti-social behavior i n  males, who 
get a Y rather than an X chromosome from their fathers, has a genetic basis) . 
1 1 5 See supra text following note 66. 
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are less likely to marry, and unmarried adults are less likely to be good 
citizens if they come from broken families. 1 16 With the breakdown of 
the traditional family there is a proliferation of people who grow up in 
broken families and never marry as adults; these people are especially 
likely to misbehave. 
Some believe that recognizing same-sex marriage would help to 
socialize homosexuals.1 1 7  This seems unlikely because men are domes­
ticated not by a wedding but by women and childrenY8 By law and by 
social and religious tradition fathers are supposed to provide for and 
instruct their children. Despite the declining importance of gender 
differences, an expectation (sometimes reflected in the application if 
not the letter of the law) 1 19 lingers that husbands should be the prima­
ry breadwinners in the family. These laws, traditions and expectations, 
which urge men to be socially responsible, would not extend to same­
sex marriages. 
C. Promoting Individual Happiness 
Traditional marriage enriches the individuals who enter into it  as 
well as their children and society generally. This effect satisfies even a 
strict test of liberal legitimacy because many benefits of marriage are 
not metaphysical but empirically verifiable. Married people live longer 
and enjoy better physical and psychological health and greater 
wealth.120 
Traditional marriage also yields spiritual benefits. As Roger 
Scruton says: "In the heterosexual act, it might be said, I move out from 
1 16 See Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 1 0, at 856. 
1 1 7  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 84 (same-sex marriage "civilizes gay men by making them 
more like lesbians") .  
l l B  See GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE 76 ( 1993);  Hadley Arkes, The Closet Stmight, 
NAT'L REV.,July 5, 1993, at 43. This also follows from evidence that men are harder to socialize 
than women, see supra note 1 15, and that l esbians are less promiscuous and more likely to 
achieve long-term relationships than gay men, see infra note 3 1 1  and accompanying text. 
l l9 Thus, despite the demise of laws distinguishing between husbands and wives with 
respect to child custody and alimony in divorce, it remains much more common for wives to 
get custody and for husbands to be required to pay alimony. See infra note 145. 
1 20 See Linda ].  Waite, Does Marriage Maller?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483 (1 995) ;  Hara Estroff 
Marano, Debunking the Marriage Myth: It Works for Women, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1 998, at F1 
(citing findings that for both men and women marriage "lengthens life, substantially boosts 
physical and emotional health and raises income over that of single or divorced people or 
those who live together"). This phenomenon is observed in other countries as well. See Steven 
Stack & ]. Ross Eshleman, Marital Status and Happiness: A 1 7-Nation Study, 60 ]. MARR. & FAM. 
527 ( 1 998). 
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my body towards tl1e otl1er, whose flesh is unknown to me;  while in  the 
homosexual act I remain locked wifuin my own body, narcissistically 
contemplating in fue oilier an excitement fuat is a mirror of my 
own ."1 2 1  Alfuough fuis view echoes Judeo-Christian tenets, i t  i s  not a 
mere expression of religious opinion. The unique value of 
heterosexual m arried love has been acknowledged in so m any cultures 
fuat it may be talcen as a general human good, like art and music, even 
if that value cannot be proved empirically. 
Bearing and raising children in a traditional marriage is also an 
intrinsic human good. The joy and fulfillment of parenthood 
acknowledged in all societies testifY strongly to their universali ty. 
These attitudes may well have a scientific basis: According to one 
evolutionary hypofuesis, love emerged along wifu the evolution of 
helpless offspring needing care from both parents, wifu consequent 
commitment and pairing. People cherish a spouse because iliat 
spouse is fue one person on a planet of billions who has as much of an 
interest in the fate of their children as t11ey do.122 
The persistence of homosexuality, divorce and marital stt-ife shows 
fuat tl1is evolved trait is not dominant in many people. A person can 
feel romantic, erotic love for anofuer person of the same sex, just as 
one can feel such love for a pet, even though reproduction is 
impossible in bofu cases. Government should not punish people 
simply because a genetic trait is weak or lacking in them . If tl1e 
scientific basis of enduring love is exclusively heterosexual, fuough, 
government can promote human happiness by favoring traditional 
marriage as ilie most conducive setting for love. Validating gay 
marriage would confuse and compromise this effect. 
Adoption and illegitimate children can bring happiness, too, but 
are everywhere considered less desirable for botl1 parents and 
children. Thus, government may validly favor traditional marriage as a 
human good. This does not mean the state should encourage a high 
1 21 ROGER SCRUTON, SEXUAL DESIRE: A MORAL PHILOSOPI-N OF THE EROTIC 3 1 0  ( 1 986) 
(emphasis in origin al ) .  Similar reasoning opposes endogamy. See infra notes 254-56 and 
accompanying text; see also Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, \•Wwt Sex Can Be: SelfAlierwlion, 
Illusion, Or One-Flesh Union, 1997 AM.J. JUIUS. 1 35 (arguing that h e terosexual mari tal sex is an 
intrinsic human good) .  Belief that traditional marriage is intrinsically good is not limited to 
Judaism and Christianity. See DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 1 2 1  ( 1 999) (finding 
that of 18 characteristics checked in  international study on choosing a mate, "mutual attraction 
or love proved to be the most highly valued in a potential mate by both sexes " ) .  
122 Buss, supra note 1 22. 
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birth rate or penalize couples who cannot or choose not to bear child­
ren.123 However, government may grant traditional marriage benefits, 
including honor, in order to promote the intrinsic good of bearing 
and ra1smg children. Although homosexual acts are sterile, 
homosexuals can play a meaningful role in their families and have 
often done so. They can have important bonds with their parents, 
siblings, nieces and nephews. Indeed, without children of their own, 
they can devote greater attention to these relationships than can adults 
with children. 
V. REFUTING THE ARGUMENTS FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
A. Rights to Autonomy in Intimate Relationships 
Some view legal recognition of same-sex marriages as part of a 
broad right to autonomy in intimate relationships, a corollary of the 
right of heterosexual couples to marry, to reproduce, to use con­
traceptives, and to obtain abortions. But there is no such right, even 
among consenting heterosexual adults. Thus the Supreme Court has 
upheld laws against polygamy124 and has never questioned laws against 
incest, adultery, bestiality and necrophilia. Unlike these other activi­
ties, same-sex marriage is not a crime; it is simply denied the legal 
recognition afforded to traditional marriages. Government has wider 
latitude in promoting than in punishing behavior. 125 Sexual autonomy 
is often claimed to be an element of privacy.126 Whatever force this 
claim has against criminal sodomy statutes does not extend to 
recognition of same-sex marriage, which entails abandonment of 
privacy and a demand for public validation. Indeed, if sexual 
autonomy is a right, the state should have "no authority to sanction, to 
reward, or even to approve one set of family relations over another," as 
some gay activists argue.127 
123 See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text. 
124 Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 ( 1946) ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
1 45 ( 1 878). See Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protection for the Right to Many: A Dissenting View, 60 
GEO. WASI-l. L. REv. 949 (1992) (denying a general constitutional right to marry) . 
12S See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text. 
126 See Friedman, supra. note 43 (making a privacy claim for same-sex marriage) .  
127 FRANK BROWNING, THE CULTURE OF DESIRE: PARADOX AND PERVERSilY I N  GAY LIVES 
TODAY 1 54 ( 1993) (describing the position taken by Paula Ettelbrick during presentation 
opposing gay marriage, Chicago, Illinois, October 1989) . See also Fenton Johnson, Wedded to an 
Illusion, HARPER'S MAG., November 1996, at 43, 49 (benefits should be granted to "couples who 
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The Supreme Court has forbidden states t o  deny recogmtwn to 
some marriages, but i t  has never questioned the favored status of 
traditional marriage and has upheld not only laws against polygamy 
but also some restrictions on marriage of prison inmates1 28 even 
though these strictures are much less widely established than the 
nonrecognition of same-sex m arriages.  Where the Court has sustained 
a constitutional right to marry, it  has referred to m arriage as "the 
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society" and to 
protecting the "decision to m arry and raise [a] child in a traditional 
family setting. "1 29 So stated, this righ t obviously does not encompass 
gay marnage. 
As already shown, society has good reason to favor tradi tional 
marriage.130 Accordingly, there is good reason n o t  to embrace a righ t 
of sexual autonomy so broad as to deny that preference. 
B. Equality: Sex Discrimination and the Analogy to Race Discrimination 
1. Sex Discrimination 
Some argue that traditional marriage is sex discrimination.131  In 
one sense this claim is false: traditional law treats the sexes equally in 
that everyone m ay marry a person of the other sex but not a person of 
the same sex. This rationale elicits two objections. The first is more 
fonnal : If a man may marry a woman, it is sex discrimination to forbid 
a woman to m arry a woman. This argum ent serves p1imarily to remind 
us how elusive or empty is the idea of equality. 132 The principle of 
equality insists that likes be treated alike; but since it  does not tell us 
demonstrate stability," whether or not they are married) .  
1 28 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 ( 1 987) (striking down some restrictions on the right of 
prison inmates to marry but upheld others ) .  Compare Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 ( 1 977) (up­
holding provisions of the Social Security Act that terminated benefits to dependent children 
upon marriage to a person not entitled to benefits under the Act even though the prospect of 
losing benefits might deter some affected people from marrying) with Zablocki v. Red hail, 434 
U.S. 374 (1 978) (striking down law forbidding indigent, support-obligated fathers of children 
receiving public assistance to marry) . 
129 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 ( 1 978 ) .  
1 30 See supra notes 62-130 and accompan}�ng te�a. 
131 See Baehr v. Le�n, 852 P.2d 44, nconsidemtion granted, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1 993) 
(holding that law recognizing heterosexual but not homosexual marriages constitutes sex 
discrimination in violation of the state constitution's Equal Protection Clause and Equal Rights 
Amendment) ; KOPPELMAN, supra note 100, at 154 ;  Andrew Koppelman, \VIIy Discrimination 
Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Disairnination, 69 NYU. L REV. 1 97 ( 1994) . 
132 See Peter Westen, The Empty idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L REV. 537 ( 1982 ) .  
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which things are alike, the principle collapses into a tautology-things 
that should be - treated alike should be treated alike. Not all 
distinctions based on sex are illegal. We h ave separate bathrooms, 
sports teams and singing groups for men and women, so the sex 
distinction in marriage law is not necessarily improper. 133 
Discrimination against homosexual acts has been defended because 
they involve different conduct from heterosexual acts. Andrew 
Koppelman objects that some sexual acts can be performed by either 
homosexual or heterosexual couples.134 Any force this objection has 
for criminal sodomy laws does not extend to marriage. As Koppelman 
concedes, only heterosexual couples can perform reproductive inter­
course.135 Since the main social function of marriage is child-rearing, 
society is warranted in distinguishing between homosexual and 
heterosexual conduct for purposes of marriage. It is irrelevant that 
heterosexual couples may engage in sexual acts other than vaginal 
intercourse. A society may (and ours usually does) treat marital sex as 
private. Non-reproductive sex can also strengthen a marriage and 
thereby make a couple better parents.136 
Koppelman and others also argue that discrimination against 
homosexuals oppresses women-heterosexism reinforces sexism.137 
He says sexism requires systematic sexual domination of women by 
men. Homosexuality is suppressed because it  undermines this domina­
tion. Male homosexuality is especially threatening because society 
deems sexual penetration a humiliation to be borne only by women. 
This theory has many problems, beginning with the assumption of 
unrelieved male domination in our society. Many factors cited to 
prove the subordination of racial minorities-shorter life expectancy 
and higher rates of illiteracy, school failure, drug abuse, mental illness 
133 This is true though some women are bigger, stronger or have deeper voices than some 
men. Thus these facts refute Andrew Koppelman's claims that sex-based classifications are per­
missible only if they reflect generalizations that are "exceptionless," Andrew Koppelman, Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: Answering the Objections 1 6 (unpublished manu­
script Oct. 14, 1 999) ; and that " [a] party challenging a sex-based classification is not required 
to show anything about the relation between the statute and the subordination of women." Id. 
at 28. 
134 KOPPELMAN, supra note 100, at 157. 
135 ld. 
136 See supra. note 86 and accompanying text. Nor is i t  relevant that some heterosexual 
couples conceive children by means other than vaginal intercourse or do not have children at 
all. See supra. notes 102-1 1 0  and accompanying text. 
137 KOPPELMAN, supra note 100, at 153-76. 
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and incarceration-would suggest Lhat males, n o t  fem ales, are 
disadvantaged in our society. 
It  is dubious that such sexual inequality as does exist is sustained by 
heterosexism. As Koppelman concedes, cultures that approve h omo­
sexuality also subordinate women; indeed, "it is possible for male 
homosexuality (at least) to be associated with m ale privilege and the 
repudiation of women ."138 Hence Koppelman retreats to the claim 
that " 'homophobia directed by men against men is misogynistic. "' 1 39 
Even this narrower claim is shaky, though. If h eterosexisrn supports 
male dominance, one would expect women to view homosexuality 
more favorably tl1an men do, but Koppelman recognizes that this is 
generally not the case. 140 
Even if discrimination against h omosexuality did bolster male 
dominance, it would be questionable whether traditional marriage 
laws contribute to this effect. One would have to argue that non­
recognition of same-sex marriages makes traditi onal m arriage (m ore) 
disadvantageous to women. This argument seems implausible; indeed, 
many of Koppelman's own statements seem to refute i t. He recognizes 
that women may support traditional families for fear of "'losing 
traditional male support."'141 He even concedes "it may be that tradi­
tional sex roles are the best ones for women."1 42 We need not go that 
far. We need only recognize that the financial, physical and emotional 
burdens of child-rearing are better borne by tw-o paren ts than by one. 
Thus m en and women who have or expect to have children benefi t 
from laws and customs that protect the traditional family. Indeed, 
since in all societies a parent who leaves the family is more likely to be 
the father, women have a more obvious in terest than mr>n in 
sheltering the traditional family. 
More obvious, though maybe not m ore important. Al though tradi-
1 38 I d. al 1 7 l .  See also infra text accompanying n ote 1 50.  
139 !d. , quoting EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, BETWEEN MEN: ENGLISH LITERATURE AND MALE 
HOMOSEXUAL DESIRE 20 ( 1 985) .  
1 4° KOPPELMAN, supra note 1 00, a t  1 6 1  n.52, quoting Gregory M .  Herek, On Heterosexual 
Masculinity: Some Psychical Consequences of the Social Construction of Gender and Sexuality, 29 AM . 
BEI-IAV. SCI. 563, 564-65 ( 1 986) : "National opinion polls typically find no significan t difference 
between males' and fem ales' responses to questions about homosexuality." Since this fact 
weakens his attempt to link heterosexism to sexism, Koppelman then quotes Herek on some 
" [s] maller-scale experimental and questionnaire studies," id., but this rescue effort seems 
desperate and unsuccessful. 
1 4 1 !d. at  1 73, quotingJEFFREYWEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3 7  ( 1985 ) .  
1 42 !d. at l 74. 
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tional marriage benefits both sexes, it seems to curb the inclinations of 
men more than of women.143 This is evidenced by the greater 
reluctance of men to marry. Moreover, in some ways traditional 
marriage does not cement male dominance but alleviates a male 
disadvantage. Children have closer biological ties to their mothers 
than� to their fathers. Conception is the end of the father's biological 
tie to the child but only the beginning of the mother's tie, which 
extends through nine months of pregnancy and, typically, through 
several months of nursing. 
Without traditional marriage, the rights of the father, and even his 
identity, would be tenuous. Many societies, including our own, grant 
mothers greater rights. For example, mothers get child custody in 
most divorces and have exclusive discretion to abort. 1 44 To some extent 
traditional marriage mitigates the inequality of paternal and maternal 
rights, though. Thus Koppelman's thesis, as applied to marriage, 
seems not only unproved but backwards-traditional marriage restricts 
the conduct of men more than of women and relieves some 
disadvantages of fathers.1 45 
Koppelman says homophobia is aimed particularly against men to 
deter them from fleeing heterosexuality,1 46 but people do not flee 
from superiority. Indeed, Koppelman himself recognizes a more 
plausible analysis: "resentment that those with familial responsibilities 
that weigh heavily upon them feel toward those who seem free from 
such responsibilities."147 In this view the role of husband/father is not 
a privilege of sexual domination but a responsibility so onerous that 
society must punish men who shirk it. 
Some common sexual terms reveal scorn for women and male 
1 43 Despite the tangible benefits of marriage to men, see AKERLOF, supra note 1 15, " [m]en  
may experience the sexual exclusivity expected within marriage as more of  a burden" than d o  
women, Amy Wax, Bargaining in  the Shadow of the Markel: Is There a Future for Egalitarian 
Maniage, 84 VA. L. REV. 509 ( 1998) . 
1 44  See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKJN, DNIDING THE CHILD 98- 1 14  ( 1993) 
(mothers get custody 70-80% of the time); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-95 
( 1992) (striking down law requiring consent of or even notice to father before abortion) . 
1 45 Indeed, in light of arguments like Koppelman's, it is ironic that William Eskridge 
supports gay marriage due in part to the tendency of (gay) males to "lose their balance and 
succumb to private sirens if they are not socially and even legally constrained." ESKRIDGE, s·upra 
note 9, at 83. Thus the argument for recognition of gay marriage is also based on gender 
stereotypes. 
146 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 100, at 1 64-65, 1 7 1 .  
147 /d. a t  1 73. 
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homosexuals. 1 48 To be "screwed," for example, is to be mistreated. 
The vernacular also illuminates gender relations in marriage. Some 
usage treats marriage as degrading to women. More often, though, 
marriage is depicted as depriving men of freedom (sexual and other­
wise) and saddling them with financial and other burdens. When a 
woman marries a man she puts a ring in his nose. By contrast, the 
bachelor is a playboy-footloose, carefree, sexually adventurous, with 
plenty of money to spend on his own pleasures. That these images are 
empirically false enhances rather than diminishes their psychological 
significance-despite the facts, men view marriage as detrimental. Gay 
marriage is often supported in order to promote public acceptance of 
homosexual conduct, but such acceptance may be "inconsistent with a 
proper recognition of the equality of women with. men in intrinsic 
worth." 1 49 
Some say discrimination against homosexual conduct is improper 
(and unconstitutional) because sexual orientation is involuntary and 
immutable and sexual pleasure is too central to human flourishing to 
be restricted by law without a compelling reason, which is lacking 
here.150 Even if sexual orientation is immutable, it does not follow that 
law cannot base distinctions on it. Many laws tum on involuntary 
characteristics, like age.151 They also differentiate by sex when there is 
good reason to do so, as in providing separate bedrooms or bathrooms 
for men and women to preserve sexual privacy. This separation is not 
universal-many societies (at one time, all societies) deem such privacy 
unnecessary, even absurd. Thus, the justification for such distinctions 
need not be universal, but only reasonable by the standards of our own 
society. 1 52 
A few people are immutably homosexual in that they cannot enjoy 
l4S See II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALI1Y (Walter R. Dynes, ed., 1990) 1 200 (terms for 
homosexuals "tend to express in their meaning or derivation the hostility, the contempt, the 
hatred, and the fear that straight people have felt toward gay sex and those who practice it") . 
149 Finnis, supra note 85, at 24. 
150 The Supreme Court has sometimes disfavored laws that discriminate on the basis of 
"immutable" characteristics. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 ( 1973). 
151 Thus blindness is involuntary yet is a bar to a driver's license, and a genetic 
predisposition to crim e  would not excuse criminal activity. Sunstein, sujn-a note 3 1 ,  at 9. 
152 See Dennis Prager, Homosexuality, the Bible and Us-a jewish Perspective, THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, Summer, 1 993, at 60, 73 (arguing that " [w]hether or not homosexuals choose 
homosexuality is entirely unrelated to the question of whether society ought to regard it as an 
equally valid way of life").  
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heterosexual relations, 153 but many people can enj oy both. Kinsey 
found that sexual orientation is not strictly bipolar but forms a 
continuum covering strong and weak preferences and neutrality 
between gay and heterosexual acts. 154 In societies intolerant of 
homosexuality more men with homosexual inclinations will enter 
traditional marriages. 155 Moreover, even if sexual orientation is 
immutable in some adults, it does not follow that it is fixed at birth. 
Some scientists believe that sexual orientation may be influenced by 
experience in early childhood. 156 
Scholars disagree about the immutability of sexual orientation.157 
Koppelman premises his whole argument on the immutability of 
sexuality. Again, he claims that male "homophobia" stems from the 
"homophobe's" uncertainty and anxiety about his own sexuality,158 but 
uncertainty arises only if sexuality is fluid. Law and social attitudes 
influence the frequency of homosexual behavior, as evidenced by the 
widely different rates of homosexual conduct between societies that 
condone and societies that condemn it.159 And even those capable 
only of homosexual relations are, if sane, able to abstain from sex with 
153 The most extensive study to date found that in America 2.8% of adult males and 1 .4% 
of adult females are predominantly homosexual. See ROBERT T.  MICHAEL, ET AL., SEX IN 
AMERICA: A DEFINITNE SURVEY 1 76 (1994) ; EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, ET AL., THE SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALilY 297 ( 1 994). Very few people are totally incapable of enjoying 
heterosexual relations. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 1 00-01 .  
154  ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 638-41 ( 1 948); see also 
ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUAUTIES: A STUDY OF DNERSllY AMONG MEN 
AND WOMEN 53-61 { 1 978) ; RICHARD C. FRIEDMAN, MALE HOMOSEXUALilY: A CONTEMPORARY 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTNE 3 ( 1988).  
155 POSNER, supra note 1 ,  at 1 1 7. 
156 See J. Maddox, Is Homosexuality Hardwi1·ed?, NATURE, Sept. 5, 1991 ,  at 1 3  (stating that 
childhood experiences (including sexual arousal) may cause physical changes in the brain that 
become permanent) . 
157 Compare POSNER, supm note 1 ,  at 295 (concluding that the evidence indicates "strongly 
though not  conclusively" that sexual orientation is more "determined" than "chosen") with 
Janet E. Halley, Sexual Otientation and the Politics of Biology: A Ctitique of the A1gument fi"om 
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 ( 1994) (denying the claim of immutability) . A recent study 
could not replicate the results of a study by a homosexual activist purporting to identi:f)' a "gay 
gene." George Rice, et aL, Male Homosexuality: Absence of Linkage to Microsatellite MmkeTS at Xq28, 
SCIENCE, April 23, 1999, at 665. Some studies report substantial success with homosexuals who 
expressed a desire to change their sexual orientation. See, e.g., THOMAS E. SCHMIDT, STRAIGHT 
AND NARROW? COMPASSION AND CLARilY IN THE HOMOSEXUALilY DEBATE 1 53-58 { 1 995). 
158 KOPPELMAN, supra note 100, at 164-65, 171 .  
1 59  See I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALilY, supra note 1 49, 578-80 (describing the impact 
of social attitudes on homosexual conduct) . 
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others. Validating same-sex marriages would sow confusion: "children 
confronted with two equally legitimate images of adult sexual roles 
would be rudderless for many years, and no one knows what personal 
or social toll would result from this prolonged period of sexual con­
fusion."160 
Because heterosexual monogamy requires equal numbers of mar­
riageable men and women, because there is already a relative scarcity 
of marriageable males, and because homosexuality seems to be more 
common among men than women, even a small increase in the 
number of active homosexuals could exacerbate the imbalance 
between marriageable men and women.161 Again, liberal societies can 
(and often do) encourage behavior they consider socially beneficial 
without having to conclude that some contrary behavior, which is not 
so favored, is harmful. Traditional marriage is beneficial, so it is not 
improper, as sex discrimination or otherwise, for society to recognize it 
but not other kinds of marriage. Traditional marriage is encouraged 
by treating it as unique, which it would not be if same-sex marriages 
were treated equally. Therefore, ihe main consequence of recogniz­
ing same-sex marriage would not be a shift of some people to homo­
sexual conduct, but the change in heterosexuals' no longer seeing 
traditional marriage as something special. 
2. The Analogy to Racial Discrimination 
Advocates of same-sex marriage compare it to interracial 
marriage.162 Defenders of anti-miscegenation laws denied that they 
were racially discriminatory because they treated all races alike by 
limiting everyone to marrying a person of the same race. In Loving v. 
Virginia163 the Supreme Court looked beyond this formal equality and 
found the laws discriminatory because they were "designed to maintain 
White Supremacy."164 The laws were intended to preserve apartheid, a 
160 Kristol, supra note 1 1 1 , at 46. 
161 See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text. Further, validation of same-sex marriage 
would diminish esteem for marriage (see infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text) and 
thereby weaken the incentives for heterosexual men to marry. 
162 See Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From jim Cmw to Same-Sex 
Maniages, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2456, 2474-75 (1994) ; Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation 
Anawgy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE LJ 1 45 (1 988);  Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality 
and tlu; Social Meaning of Gender, 1 988 WIS. L. REV. 1 87, 232-33. 
163 388 U.S. I ( 1967). 
164 !d. at 1 1 .  
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racial caste system, by enforcing "racial boundaries. " 165 
615 
Gay marriage is radically different from, and antipodal to, 
interracial marriage within the traditions of Western culture.166 Chris­
tianity expressly condemned racism as, for example, in the parable of 
the Good Samaritan.167 Anti-miscegenation laws were almost unheard 
of outside the United States, and less than one-third of the states had 
such laws when Loving was decided.168 Thus in striking down these 
laws Loving did not reject but embraced Western tradition. By 
contrast, neither the West nor any other culture has ever recognized 
same-sex marriage, and Christianity, like Judaism, has always 
condemned homosexual acts. By embracing Western tradition Loving 
argues against recognition of same-sex marriage. 
Anti-miscegenation laws prevented intimate contact between the 
races. Traditional marriage laws do not keep the sexes apart but bring 
them together.169 Interracial marriages create mixed-race children; 
same-sex marriages do not create mixed-gender children. In the 
analogy between race and gender, traditional marriage resembles 
integration; gay marriage resembles segregation. It is not surprising, 
then, that most Afro-Americans reject the analogy between the civil 
rights and homosexual movements. 170 Government does not compel 
racial integration, but it can encourage integration by education, 
exhortation and subsidies. Likewise, government cannot force 
individuals into traditional marriages, but it can encourage traditional 
marriages by favoring them in various ways. 
The logical inconsistency of gay marriage has already become 
apparent in litigation over the benefits offered by some employers to 
gay couples. Suits have alleged that denial of these benefits to 
165 Sunstein, sup-ra note 31, at 18 .  
166 Even gay activists often admit that race and homosexuality are very different with 
respect to discrimination. See SULLIVAN, sup-ra note 101 ,  at 151-54 (arguing that race is dif­
ferent because sexual orientation can be hidden and is a complex "mixture of identity and 
behavior;" and because "homosexuals are not subject to inherited and cumulative patterns of 
economic discrimination" and " (t]here was no slavery for homosexuals") ;  see generally Lynn D. 
Wardle, Loving v.  Virginia and the Coustitutiona.l Right to Marry, 1 79().1 990, 41 HOWARD LJ. 289 
( 1998).  
167 Luke 10:30-37. The Samaritans were a disliked minority. By helping the injured Levite 
the Good Samaritan ignored racial distinctions. 
1 GB See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 120-2 1 .  
169 See Sunstein,  supra. note 31,  at 20 n.65. 
170 See Lena Williams, Blacks Rejecting Gay Rights a.s a. Battle Equal to Thein, N.Y. TIMES, june 
28, 1993, at AI . 
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unmanied heterosexual couples is illegal discrimination . The first few 
claims have failed.171 However, the arguments for legitimizing same­
sex marriage based on equality and sexual p1ivacy and autonomy 
would also bar discrimination against unmanied heterosexual couples. 
Certainly any claim that a gay maniage is morally superior or more 
beneficial to society than heterosexual cohabitation "\vithout marriage 
would strike m ost Americans as ludicrous. 
3. If There Is an Equality Problem, Validating Same-Sex Jvlarriage Does Not 
Solve It 
If maniage laws cause invidious inequality by bestmving benefits on 
some but not all people, the just solution is not  to extend those 
benefits to gay marriages. That step would still leave discrimination 
against polygamy and endogamy and, more importantly, against those 
who cannot or choose not to marry. Indeed, many gay activists oppose 
recognition of same-sex maniages because it would deprecate 
unmanied gays. 172 Complete equality would require eliminating any 
legal preference for marriage and treating ail individuals alike, regard­
less of whether they are manied.  That advocates of same-sex marriage 
do not propose this shows that equality is not their real goal . 
C. Recognizing Gay Marriages Would Damage Traditional Maniage 
1. Many Advocates of Sarne-Sex Marriage Want to Transform Traditional 
Marnage 
Many advocates of same-sex marriage seelz not to expand traditional 
maniage to gays but revolutionize the instj t11 tjon . 1 73 William Esklirlge 
hopes gay maniage "\vill dethrone the traditional family based on 
blood-relationships in favor of "families we choose."1 74 Michaelangelo 
1 71 See Foray v. Bell Atlantic, 56 F. Supp 2d. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1 999) (denying relief under 
Federal statutes). The court concluded that the discrimination was not invidious because gay 
couples cannot marry but heterosexual couples can. Jd. at 330. It is doubtful, however, that 
most Americans would find this a morally persuasive distinction. 
172 Stephen Noll usefully distinguishes between "deconstructionists [who] fear that 
marriage may co-opt the [gay] liberation movement, while rcconstructionist.s argue that same­
sex marriage may serve as a means by which the entire institution may be redefined." Noll, 
supra note 9, at 59. See irifm notes 3 1 0-1 7 and accompanying text (many gays oppose recog­
nition of gay marriage). 
173 See Nitya Duclos, Some Comf!licaling Thoughts on Same-Sex Maniage, I LAW & SEXUALITY 3 1  
( 1 99 1 ) .  
174 ESKRIDGE, supra note 9 ,  at 8 1 ; see also KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, 
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Signorile urges activists "to fight for same-sex marriage and its benefits 
and then, once granted, redefine the institution of marriage complete-
ly, . . .  to debunk a myth and radically alter an archaic institution . . .  . 
The most subversive action lesbians and gay men can undertake . . .  is 
to transform the notion of 'family' entirely."1 75 Urvashi Vaid wants to 
"assimilate the straight world to the gay world."176 Although the 
consequences of validating same-sex marriage cannot be predicted, 
companionate marriage fosters anti-homosexual attitudes177 and could 
therefore be a target of gay activists. 
The question of the impact of gay marriage on public attitudes 
raises a related question: Why do supporters of gay marriage spurn the 
alternative of domestic partnership laws, which could confer the same 
legal benefits as marriage?178 The reason is that they are interested 
primarily in the intangible benefits-the honor, respect, the social 
stamp of approval-that legally recognized marriage brings. 179 But the 
corollary to recognition would be that traditional child-bearing and 
child-rearing marriages would no longer be legally special. They 
would be treated as no better than a gay partnership, which to most 
people would constitute not only the denial of a deserved accolade but 
a calculated insult. 
2. Weakening the Incentives to Marry 
Why do couples marry? A desire to make a mutual commitment, 
even in public, is not a reason since that can be done without 
marriage. The material legal benefits of marriage are mostly minor 
and often outweighed by the material detriments. 180 The main 
motives to marry, then, are intangible. Society honors marriage. Law 
confirms this honor by recognizing marriage. In judaism, Christianity, 
and many otl1er faiths, marriage is a sacrament, a union blessed by 
GAVS, KINSHIP 1 1 6  ( 199 1 ) ;  Sullivan, supra note 101 ,  at 202-05. 
175 1£chelangelo Signorile, Bridal Wave, OUT, Dec.:Jan., 1994, at 1 6 1 .  See also Franklin 
Kameny, Deconslrucling lhe Tra.dilional Family, THE WORLD & I, Oct. 1993, at 393-95. " [T] here is 
no legitimate basis for limiting the freedom of the individual to structure his family in 
nontraditional ways that he finds satisfying . . . .  " !d. at 385. 
176 URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALI1Y: THE MA!NSTREAMING OF GAY AND LESBIAN 
LIBERATION 208 ( 1 995) .  
177 POSNER, supra note 1 ,  at  157-58. 
178 See supra notes 1 3-14 and accompanying text. 
179 See supra note 1.  
180 See supra note 56. 
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God. The religious associations o f  m aniage are importan t even to 
unbelievers; many who o therwise never enter a church or temple still 
insist on being married there. Marriage is "a public tradition that car­
ries with i t  experience and wisdom beyon d  the reach of the lifetime of 
any single couple."18 1  People follow social nonns because they value 
the opinions of others, and law h elps to shape those nonns.1 82 
Marriage is the social norm for adults; singles fi t  awkwardly or not at 
all into many social settings. Singles are often considered u nfortunate 
( "he/she can ' t  find a spouse") or psychologically stunted - unmarried 
men have been viewed as immature. However, many norm s  that once 
made bachelorhood unattractive for men have weakened . 1 33 Society 
generally treats a marriage as valid only if i t  is legally recognized. Thus 
polygam ous and endogamous m arriages are generally honored only i n  
societies where such marriages are legal. 
Honor, or social approval, is the main reason why legal recogni tion 
of gay maniages is so eagerly sought. Desire for honor and fear of 
dishonor are powerful incentives. For example, Ame1i cans pay taxes 
more readily than most other people, not because our penalties for tax 
evasion are harsher but because our social customs condemn tax 
evasion; 184 elsewhere it is downplayed as illegal but n o t  immoral . 
People often endure terrible hardship, even brave certain death, to 
gain or main tain honor.185 
The honor conferred by law is fragile, however, because i t  depends 
on social attitudes as material benefi ts do not. A tax break can be 
extended from one group to others without reducing i ts worth to the 
form er, but the award of honor is necessarily selective and judgmental. 
An honor too freely granted l oses value . 1 86 If it is gran ted for acts 
181 Phil ip Turner, St!xual Ethics and the Attack a n  Traditiollol Morality 19 ( 1 988) (pamphlet 
on file with the author) . 
1 82 Sec l\1ATJ' RIDLEY, THE ORiGiNS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN ]NSTINCJ'S AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION 1 8 1-86 ( 1 998) ; Sunstein,  supra note 3 1 ,  at 954. See also sujna notes 25-3,1 and 
accompanying text (discussing the "expressive" function of law, i ncluding the bestowing of 
honor) . 
1 83 See Wax, sujJra. note 1 44, at 666-67 ( describing the demise of these norms) .  
184 See Editorial, LoojJlwles in I. R.S. Iwfarm, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1 998, at A20 ( t;u compliance 
in  America "is far higher than i n  many o ther Western countries") . 
1 85 See jAMES M .  MCPHERSON, FOR CAUSE AND COMRADES: WHY MEN FOUGHT IN THE CIVIL 
WAR 90-103 ( 1 997) (claiming that soldiers on both sides in the Am erican Civil War fought more 
for honor than for abstract causes). 
185 See WILLIAM j .  GOODE, TI-lE CELEBRATION OF H EROES: PREST ICE AS A CONTROL SYSTEM 
4 6--'18 ( 1 978) (prestige is governed by laws of supply and deman d ) .  
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most people condemn, its value will decline more sharply. Thus many 
honors are aggressively restricted. A corpse improperly buried at 
Arlington National Cemetery is exhumed and expelled,187 and Con­
gress enacts a law to limit this honor.188 An admiral kills himself 
because of charges that he wore medals he did not earn.189 Only one 
American - Martin Luther King, Jr. - is honored with an annual 
national holiday. If these honors were granted liberally, they would be 
cheapened, and the impact of the honors on social attitudes and 
behavior would be diluted. 
Gays themselves recognize the value of exclusion. Although gays try 
to force organizers of ethnic parades to include them,190 organizers of 
gay parades sometimes exclude transvestites and pro-pederasty 
groups191 because including them would incur contempt for all gays. 
Recognition of gay marriage would have the same effect on attitudes 
toward marriage generally. 
Acknowledging the psychological function of law and honor shows 
that those who say that nonrecognition of gay marriage is "irrational" 
have a point.192 Soldiers who fight for honor or for a moral cause are 
not behaving "rationally" in the sense that the costs of their actions far 
exceed the material benefits. The same is true ofvoting. Because one 
vote rarely alters the result of an election, not voting is "rational 
apathy."193 A democracy, then, needs "irrational" citizens who devote 
more effort to studying issues, supporting candidates, and voting, than 
a rational weighing of material costs and benefits would warrant. 
Democracies encourage this irrationality by trumpeting voting as a 
duty and a privilege. But many people do not vote if they see that 
many of their fellow citizens don't bother. For soldiering, too, social 
187 See Stephen Barr, Panel Vows to Tightm Rules for Adington B'U1ial: Politica.Uy-Conner.ted Have 
l!.age, Chairman Says, WASH.  POST, jan. 29, 1998, at A17. 
188 38 u.s.c. § 2402 ( 1994) . 
189 See Philip Shenon, His Medals Questioned, Top Admiml Kills Hi·mself, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,  
1996, at A3. 
190 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 566 
(1995) (striking down on First Amendment grounds state court order that organizers of St. 
Patrick's Day parade allow homosexual advocacy group to participate) .  
191 See Mark Higgins, Gays Put Their P1ide on Parade, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 1 ,  
1996, at B1  (pro-pederasty group excluded from a Seattle "gay pride" march).  
192 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 176-78 (arguing that sexual orientation is "an irrational 
classification"). 
193 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-74 ( 1 957) . 
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attitudes are cmcial. When society denigrates mili tary service, as 
happened with Americans in Vietnam, many young men try to avoi d  
combat. 
Similarly, m arrying, staying married, and bearing and raising 
children are in any material accounting irrational . In that sense, 
Eskridge is right: society's privileging of traditional marriage 
encourages conduct that is in a sense irrational for individuals but 
essential to society's well-being. Esloidge denies that legal validation of 
marriage confers honor: "the state is n o t  a bit choosy about who can 
marry."1 94 This misses the point, and he corrects his own error when 
he says: "the state gives its stamp of approval to the insti tution of mar­
riage," not "to particular couples."195 But what is the nature of the 
ins ti tution which earns social approval? Eskri dge himself is "choosy;" 
he disapproves some polygamous and incestuous m aniages. 1 96 
Some support gay maniage precisely because it would change 
attitudes toward homosexuality general1y. 197 They are probably 1ight 
that recognition would change attitudes toward m aniage just as liber­
alization of divorce laws did. Marriage, once a sacred bond that could 
be broken only with great difficulty and for compelling reasons, can 
now be dissolved by either party for any reason or no reason at all. 
Not surprisingly, respect for m aniage plummeted. 
It does not follow, though, that validating gay m aniage would 
enhance regard for homosexuality without eroding respect for tradi­
tional marriage. Some claim that recognition would "buttress the ethic 
of he terosexual marriage, by showing how even those excluded from i t  
can wish to model themselves o n  i ts shape and structure. " 1 98 This defies 
belief. Most .A�mericans oppose recogniti on of gay marriage, 1 99 and 
1 9'1 ESKJULJGE, supra note 9, at 1 06; sce also id. at 1 05-09. 
195 !d. at 1 05. 
1 96 !d. at  1'15-S l .  
197 See supra note 1 .  
198 SULLIVAN, supra note 99, at 1 1 2 .  
199 ESKRJDGE, supra. note 9,  at  244 n.53 (citing a 1 992 poll ) .  Eskridge admits recognition 
would provoke "vociferous, even violent resistance by homophobic heterosexuals." !d. at 8 1 .  
Iv1ost Ame ricans disapprove o f  homosexuality. See ;'\_L'\N WOLFE, ONE NATION , AHER ALL 72-76 
( 1 998) (noting that in a survey, seventy percent of the people questioned condemned 
h omosexual i ty).  Wolfe found the dominant attitude to be: " [ J ]f what they're asking for is for 
me, Mr. Average American, to say yes, your life style is the moral equivalent  of mine,  that I ' m  
not willing t o  d o . "  Carey Goldberg, Acceptance of Gay Men and Lesbian\ is Growing, Study Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 3 1 ,  1 998, at A15.  The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force found that "disap­
proval of homosexuality . . .  was still 56 percent in 1 996".  !d. 
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public reaction to the decision in Baehr v. Lewin led to a Constitutional 
Amendment that allowed the Hawaii legislature to restrict marriage to 
opposite sex couples.200 Validating gay marriage would break the link 
of marriage to the divine, to the miracle of creation of new life, and to 
the rich tradition of love and commitment between husbands and 
wives. " [F]or our intimacies to survive they must receive public 
recognition and support. "201 Validating gay marriage would dilute this 
support and lead to demands that unmarried couples receive the same 
legal benefits as spouses.202 
If respect for gay marriage did grow, it would do so at the expense 
of traditional religion: "People who reject Christian doctrine on sex . . .  
may reject the remainder of Christian doctrine as well . . . . "203 Given 
the centrality of religion in fostering individual responsibility and con­
cern for others and in resisting such social evils as drug abuse and 
crime,204 such abandonment could seriously harm society. 
Harvey Fierstein's play, Torch Song Trilogy, shows the typical feelings 
about gay marriage. After the death of his lover the protagonist tells 
his mother that he is "widowing." The outraged mother says: "Are you 
trying to compare my marriage with you and Alan? . . .  How dare you! . 
. . May God strike me dead! Whatever I did to my mother to deserve a 
child speaking to me this way."205 To most people, gay marriage would 
be a "mocking burlesque"206 or "mere parody" of traditional marr­
iage.207 James Q. Wilson suspects legal recognition "would call even 
more seriously into question the role of marriage at a time when the 
threats to it, ranging from single-parent families to common divorces, 
have hit record highs."208 Andrew Sullivan, an advocate of same-sex 
marriage, admits that " [e] ven those tolerant of homosexuals may find 
this institution [marriage] so wedded to the notion of heterosexual 
200 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
201 Turner, supra note 182, at 19. 
202 See supra text accompanying note 187. 
203 POSNER, supra note I, at 1 75. 
204 See GUENTER LEWY, WHY AMERICA NEEDS RELIGION 1 1 7-21 ( 1996) .  
205 HARVEY FIERSTEIN, TORCH SONG TRILOGY 1 44-46 ( 1979) .  
20fi Arkes, supra note 1 1 9, at 45. 
207 James Q. Wilson, Against Homosexual Marriage, COMMENTARY, March, 1 996, at 34, 36  
(quoting Kenneth Minogue's book review of  Virtually Normal) .  
208 Jd. 
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commiul ent that t o  extend i t  would be to undo i ts very essence."209 
Some back gay m a11iage despite its uncertain effects: "We ought to 
pull the pin and see what happens."210 This attitude would strike many 
(including the author) as reckless when applied to an institution cen­
tral to the condition of society. 
Some commentators recall that the widespread and often bitter 
opposition to racial integration eroded after World War II and predic t  
that hostility to gay marriage will also collapse i f  i t  is sanctioned.21 1 
Unfortunately, while racism has sharply declined in recent decades, 
considerable racial friction persists. Moreover, as already noted, the 
analogy to race is fau1ty.212 Jim Crow segregation was a regional 
aberration, a deviation from Western tradi tion and from Christian and 
Jewish doctrine.  By contrast, disapproval of homosexuality and 
reverence for tradi tional marriage are in tegral to Western tradition 
and Christianity. Thus a be tter comparison Lh.an racial integration 
would be cannibalism or commission of sex acts in public.  Both have 
been condoned in some societies but long abhorred in Western 
civilization. It is doubtful that legalizing these acts would rapidly lead 
to their public acceptance. General approval of gay marriage would 
require either an official change in traditional Christian, Jewish, and 
Moslem doctline, or wholesale abandonmen t of these fai ths by 
Americans. Both are highly unlikely. 
Revolutionizing social attitudes toward homosexuality seems 
especially unlikely if gay maniage were legally imposed by judges. In 
rulings on the death penalty, the rights of criminal defendan ts, racial 
preferences, and busing to promote school in tegration, the Supreme 
Court took positions far to the left of the American mainstream , b1.1 t 
the people were not won over. Indeed, some decisions may have galva­
nized opposition and thereby reversed a gradual lefh¥ard trend in 
209 SULLIVAN, supra note 1 0 1 ,  at 1 79. 
2 1° Christine Pierce, Gay j\;Janiage, 2 6 ] .  SOCIAL PI-IlL. no. 2, 5, 1 0  ( 1 995 ) .  The Supreme 
Court of Vermont flirted with a similar recklessness i n  Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1 999) . 
While ordering the legislature to extend the same ben efits to gay couples as to married 
couples, the court did not insist that m arriage be open to gays because " [a] sudden change in 
the marriage laws or the statutory benefits traditionally incidental to marriage may have 
disruptive and unforeseen consequences." Jd. at 887. Given this admission, it is astonishing 
that the court simply leaves the whole question to the legislature. 
21 1 See ON THE ROAD TO SAJvlE-SEX MARRIAGE: A SUPPORTIVE GUIDE TO PSYCI-IOLOGICAL, 
POLITICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES 1 9<1-96 (Robert P. Cabaj & David W. Purcell, eds., 1 998) . 
21 2 See S11pra notes 1 63-71 and accompanying text. 
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public opinion.213  Unlike the Court's dismantling of Jim Crow 
segregation, these decisions did not grow out of but often ran counter 
to Western tradition. Gay marriage is so contrary to Western tradition 
that the public would probably reject any judicial move to condone it. 
The effect of validating gay marriage would tum in part on gays' 
response to it. Most advocates of gay marriage want it as an option for 
gays, not the norm; they do not expect that, for gays, love and mar­
riage will go together like a horse and carriage. And why should they? 
The purposes of traditional marriage-to rear children, to give 
mothers economic support, and to yoke the energies of males to 
families-will not apply to gay couples. Although most lesbians 
already live in stable relationships, most gay men do not,21 4  which 
suggests that sexual conduct is dictated by deep-seated attitudes toward 
fidelity and promiscuity rather than by a marriage certificate. The 
paucity of registrations under Hawaii's domestic partnership law215  
shows that the tangible legal benefits of marriage are unimportant to 
most gays. Despite legal recognition, few gay men would marry. The 
effect of recognition, then, might be less to elevate esteem for 
homosexuality than to diminish regard for marriage. 
3. Weakening the Incentives to Stay Married 
Recent research documents the carnage wrought by the breakdown 
of the traditional family. Children were supposed to profit if their 
parents' unhappy marriages were dissolved.216 We now know that di­
vorce devastates not only small children, as many expected, but older 
children, too, and the damage persists, often for life .217  Most divorced 
213  Justice Ginsburg believes that the Court's abortion decisions may have had this effect. 
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 1 85, 1 199-1205 (1992) .  
21 4  See infra note 230. 
21 5  See supra note 57. 
21 6 "Perhaps the most persuasive justification for unrestricted availability of divorce is the 
empirical assumption that if either parent is sufficiently dissatisfied with the marriage to 
contemplate divorce, then the child may be more harmed by the continuation of the unhappy 
marriage than by divorce." Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Maniage and 
Divorce, 76 VA. L. ru:v. 9 (1990) at 29. 
217  See generally LENORE WEITZMAN, THE D IVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA ( 1 985); JUDITH S. 
WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES. MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN: A DECADE 
AFTER D IVORCE ( 1989) ; see also Scott, supra note 2 1 6  at 29-37 (divorce damages children unless 
tl1ere is "intense conflict" within the marriage) ;  Wax, supra note 1 44, at 671 (analyzing why and 
how divorce is more damaging to women and children than to men).  
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women and their children suffer a lower standard of living.21 8  The 
tl1reat of divorce constrains women even during marriage. Many 
women hold j obs, for example, not for Lhe needs of the intact family 
but for fear of divorce .219 No-faul t  divorce causes an increase in abuse 
of wives by husbands220 and creates uncertainty that discourages cou­
ples from having children. 221 
The impact of divorce on husbands is l ess clear but, given the 
benefits of marriage, it is likely that divorce generally leaves men worse 
off, too .  Although marriage is generally beneficial and divorce detri­
mental not only to children and society as a whole but also to the par­
ties themselves, people often fail  to appreciate this fact. Accordingly, 
society needs to support marriage.222 
Some supporters of gay maniage criticize tl1ose who worry m ore 
about h omosexuality tl1an about the bigger problem of divorce.223 
The oi ticism is valid,224 but it undermines rather t11an advances the 
case for gay marriage because i t  would further weaken the disincen­
tives to divorce. The main objection to divorce has always been its 
damage to children. Since gays canno t  reproduce and rarely adopt, 
this objection would not apply to m ost gay marriages. A second 
objection is that divorce often iruures wives botl1 economically 
(because most women earn less than m en) and socially (because it is 
harder for divorced women to remarry tl1an for divorced men and 
because divorced women are less accepted in society than divorced 
men) . This objection would also be invali d  for gay couples. 
The absence of children and instability of gay relationships vvill 
2 18 See Scott, supra n o te 2 1 6 ,  at 33. 
2 1 9  See Gene Koretz, Why JV!anied Women Work, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 22, 1 997, a t  26 (citi n g  study 
by Allen M. Parkman) .  
220 Brinig & Crafton, supra note 48, a t  887-92 (showing a posi tive correlation between the 
adoption of n o-faul t  divorce and an i ncrease in spouse abuse) .  
221 Jd. a t  887 ( " [T] here are fewer births per thousand population i n  those states that have 
adopted a true n o-fault regime") . 
222 The Ramsey Colloquium connects this need with the difficulties of rearing children: 
"Having and rearing children is among the most difficult of human projects. Men and women 
need all the support they can get to mai n tain stable marriages in which the next generation 
can flourish." The Homosexual lvlov�:ment: A Re.Jj)(]nse by the Rn.nmy Collvquiwn, supra note 1 05 ,  at 
18. I t  can only be added that the difficulties of marriage are not  l imited to child-rearing. 
223 See Stephen A. Macedo, Homosexunlity rmd the Consenmtive Mind, S<J CEO. LJ. 261 ,  287 & 
n.99 ( 1 995) .  
224 111e same point is made by some who defend the family and criticize tl1e homosexual movement 
See The Homosexua.[ Movement: 11 Resj;onse by the RnmsLy Colloquium, supm note l 05, at 16 .  
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mean higher divorce rates for gay couples.225 Indeed, many of its 
advocates do not expect or want gay marriages to be permanent. In 
weddings of the Metropolitan Community Church, the largest sect 
dedicated to gays, couples vow to stay together "so long is there is 
love,"226 not "until death us do part."227 A wedding sanctifies marriage, 
conveys its solemnity, and calls the community to support the couple. 
The formality of a marriage license both underscores the gravity of 
marriage and protects spouses (especially the weaker party-usually 
the wife) by clarifying and recording their status. Given the instability 
of gay marriages, it is not surprising that some of its advocates criticize 
the very requirement of a wedding ceremony and license and the legal 
recognition of marriage. 228 
Validating gay marriage would encourage adultery. Sexual fidelity 
is rare among gay men.229 Andrew Sullivan cheers that gays' "need for 
225 See POSNER, supra. note 1 ,  at 305-{)6 (instability of gay relationships) . 
226 ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 194 (quoting the vows taken in such ceremonies). This atti­
tude belies the claim voiced by Andrew Sullivan that recognizing gay m arriage would stabilize 
gay relationships. SULLNAN, supra. note 101 ,  at 202; see also Christensen, supra. note 1, at 1 726 
(conceding uncertainty whether marriage has "the same meaning-entailing commitment to 
the same values-for gay people as for their heterosexual counterparts") .  
227 THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 302 (Seabury Press 1976) . The difference is telling in  
one other respect. In Christianity and Judaism one ought to love one's spouse; ceasing to do so  
is a fault one should try to  correct. The gay ceremony posits no such duty; the commitment 
ceases when love ends, for whatever reason. 
228 See Mohr, supra. note 6,  at 229-30 (calling the requirement of a ceremony "misguided" 
and calling gay marriage superior because it is  not automatically sanctified) . Mohr says: "until 
recently, by far the most usual form of marriage in western civilization [was] common law mar­
riage-in which there is no marriage license or solemnization." Id. at 230. Until recently, 
however, most people were peasants who lacked the capability, and often, the legal right to 
leave a small village, so informal marriages were usually stable. If they did dissolve, the law 
cared little because the demands of child-rearing are lower in agrarian societies and feudal 
societies cared little about peasant marriages. See genera.Uy MARY ANN GLENDON, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW (1989). 
229 See DENNIS ALTMAN, THE HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, THE AMERICANIZATION OF 
THE HOMOSEXUAL 1 87 ( 1982) (" [A]mong gay men a long-lasting monogamous relationship is 
almost unknown.") ;  DAVID P. MCWHIRTER & ANDREW M. MATTISON, THE MALE COUPLE: HOW 
RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOP 285 ( 1984) (finding that "sexual exclusivity . . .  was not the ongoing 
expectation for most" male couples); Leon McCusick et aL, AIDS and Sexual BehavioT Rep01·ted by 
Gay Men in San Francisco, 75 AM. ]. PUBLIC HEALTH 493, 493-95 ( 1 985) (reporting that their 
1 985 s tudy revealed that substantial percentages of gay men were not involved in monogamous 
relationship). 
The renowned expert on human sexuality, Dr. David Reuben, offers this explanation for 
the promiscuity of gay men: "Homosexuals are trying the impossible: solving the problem with 
only half the pieces. They say they want gratification and love but they eliminate, right from 
the start, the most obvious source of love and gratification - woman." Thomas Vinciguerra, 
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extramarital outlets" will make adultery more acceptable for all 
married couples. 230 He condemns the "baleful . . . attempt" to impose 
"a stifling model of heterosexual normality."231 If same-sex marriages 
were made legally and socially equal, these attitudes would spread to 
traditional marriages. 
The law could . set separate divorce standards for traditional and 
same-sex marriages, but that would contradict the principle of gay 
activists that the two are equal. Since the main objections to divorce 
do not apply to gay marriages, a unified standard would inevitably drift 
toward easier divorces. Moreover, the case for gay marriage rests 
largely on the argument for autonomy in intimate matters.232 In this 
view, society has no right to define marriage; it must only validate 
individuals' choices. But if the right to autonomy forbids society to 
limit the creation of marriage, it also forbids society to limit the 
termination of marriage. A right to marriage on demand also implies 
a right to divorce on demand. 
Recognizing gay marriages would also dilute the social stigma of 
divorce. Divorce is discouraged not only by legal obstacles but also by 
the likely disapproval of relatives, neighbors, and friends at work and 
in church. This disapproval reflects popular belief that divorce is 
damaging, especially to wives and children, and that marriage is a 
sacred commitment not to be casually broken. These attitudes do not 
apply to gay marriages. Thus, treating gay and traditional marriages 
alike would further dilute the stigma of divorce. As Barbara 
Whitehead puts it: "Once the social metric shifts from child well-being 
to adult well-being, it is hard to see divorce and nonmarital birth in 
anything but a positive light."233 
More generally, marriage loses its value as a standard form if it must 
cover many kinds of relationships.234 In particular, legitimizing gay 
Evi!7ything Yau Ever Wanted to Know About Changing With the Times, N.Y. TIMES, March 21 ,  1 999, § 
4, at 7 (quoting DAVID REUBEN, EVERYfHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT SEX 
142 ( 1969) ) .  
230 SULLIVAN, supra. note 101 ,  at  202. Richard Mohr also praises gay male couples for 
realizing that sexual fidelity is not necessary to show their love for each other and advocating 
that ·in this respect, inter alia, gay male couples may "provide models and materials for 
rethinking family life and improving family law." Mohr, supra note 6, at 233. 
231 Sullivan, supra note 101 ,  at 203; see also Peter Freiberg, Some Gays An,n't Wedded to the 
Idea of Same-Sex Maniage, THE ADVOCATE 530, no. 16 ( 1989) . 
232 See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. 
233 Whitehead, supra. note 66, at 52. 
234 See generally Douglas Allen, An Inqui·1y into the State's Role in Maniage, 13 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
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marriage would damage traditional families by promoting "an ideology 
of 'recreational' sexuality that divorces sex from marital unity and 
treats marital infidelity as a relatively unimportant matter."235 
D. Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage Would Harm the Vast Majority of Women 
Mlho Want Traditional Marriages 
Legitimizing same-sex marriage would harm women more than 
men. Homosexuality is more common among men than women.236 
Condoning same-sex marriage and homosexuality would remove more 
men than women from the market for traditional marriage. That 
market already has more women than men for several reasons, 
including higher mortality, homosexuality, incarceration, and drug 
addiction rates among men, and greater reluctance of suitable men to 
seek marriage. The disparity is widest in inner cities.237 It prevents 
some women who want a spouse from finding one. Further, a surplus 
of a commodity depresses its market value. The relative surplus of 
unmarried women strengthens the bargaining power of men, who can 
demand one-sided terms of courtship or simply forego maniage 
altogether because the surplus of single women enables them to 
obtain what they want from a woman without the burdens of marriage. 
The surplus of single women also harms married women by en­
abling a divorced man to find a new spouse more easily than a di­
vorced woman can. This increases the bargaining power of married 
men, who can more credibly threaten to divorce and re-marry than 
can their wives. Because there are more homosexual men than 
women, recognition of same-sex marriages would aggravate these 
problems by increasing the imbalance between men and women 
seeking traditional marriages, thereby undermining sexual equality. 
E. Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages Would Logically Require Several Other 
Changes in the Law 
To repeat: Same-sex marriage is not singled out for non-recognition 
& 0RG. 171  ( 1 990). 
235 Amitai Etzioni & Robert P. George, ViTlue and the Stale: A Dialngue Between a 
Communilarian and a Social Consemalive, REsPONSIVE COMMUNI1Y., Spring, 1999, at 54, 65 
(statement by Robert P. George) .  
23fi POSNER, supra note 1, at 99. 
237 See id. at 136-41 . 
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i n  our law; many other forms of marriage-polygamy, endogamy, and 
bestiality-are invalid or even forbidden. Rather, traditional marriage 
is singled out for endorsement. Arguments for approving gay 
marriage apply at least as strongly to these other forms, and arguments 
against the others apply at least as strongly to gay marriage. The 
arguments for gay marriage also support cloning, and arguments 
against cloning also oppose gay marriage. If we condone gay mar­
riage, then, we must also condone the other arrangements; if we reject 
the others, we must also reject gay marriage. 
1. Polygamy 
Gay actiVIsts champion autonomy in intimate relationships238 and 
charge that traditionalists simply fear what is different and mindlessly 
mouth religious prejudice. 239 On these grounds polygamy is even easi­
er to support because, unlike gay maniage, i t  has been and still is 
condoned by many religions and societies. 240 The Equal Protection 
argument for same-sex marriage also applies to polygamy. The ban on 
polygamy discriminates not only against religions that approve 
polygamy but also bisexuals, who cannot act on their sexual preference 
·within marriage unless they can have multiple spouses. It  is not sur­
prising, then, that some commentators link the arguments for same­
sex marriage and polygamy.241 As Hadley Arkes says, "Every argument 
for gay marriage is an argument that would support polygamy."242 
23S See supra notes 1 25-30 and accompanying text. 
239 See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text. 
2'10 In non-Western societies polygamy is the norm. POSNER, supra note 1 ,  at 69. Unlike 
homosexuality, polygamy is not even condemned in the Bibl e but was practiced by the ancient 
Hebrews. See jAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRJSTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 5� 
( 1 987) ; Noonan, s·upra note 62, at 32. 'Western Jews practiced polygamy until about A.D. 1 000, 
Eastern jews until well into the twentieth century." POSNER, supra note 1, at 49. 
2'11 See Chambers, snjJra note 1 ,  at 489-91 (supporting legalization of polygamy) . Leaders 
of the 1 993 gay march on Washington drafted a platform that included a demand for "legaliza­
tion of multiple paru1er unions." See Texas Platform Agreement }in Next Year's Ma:rch, WASI-l . 
BLADE, May 22, 1 992. In I 972 the National Coalition of Gay Organizations demanded " [r] e­
peal of all legislative provisions that restrict the sex or number of persons entering into a 
marriage unit." ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 54 (quoting the National Coalition of Gay 
Organizations' 1 972 demands for law reforms); see also PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED 
STORJES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 238-41 ( 1 997) . Richard Posner sees a positive 
correlation between acceptance of polygamy and rates of homosexual activity. He seems to 
believe that causation runs from the former to the latter. POSNER, supra note 1 ,  at I 36. 
242 One Man, One Woman, WASHINGTON WATC!-!, Jan. 26, 1 998,  at 1 (containing statement 
by Hadley Arkes) . This point is conceded by some advocates of gay marriage. See Carlos A. 
Ball , !'vi oral Fo-undatiow for a Discourse on Sam<"Sex Maniage: Loa/ring Beyo·nd Political Libera.lism, 85 
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Laws against polygamy can be defended only with reasoning that 
also excludes same-sex marriage. In practice, polygamy usually means 
polygyny, which allegedly denies equality to women. At first blush this 
. . .  charge seems strange. Adding women to a law partnership or a college 
faculty is deemed to raise women's status. Why does not adding more 
women to a marriage do the same? The answer is that, unlike a law 
firm or faculty, marriage in our society is viewed as a unique personal, 
emotional, and sexual commitment between a man and a woman 
which would be diluted and distorted by polygamy.243 This reasoning 
makes a normative judgment about marriage that also precludes gay 
marriages. If we eschew moral judgments in favor of value neutrality 
and individual autonomy, we can condone gay marriage but must also 
accept polygamy. To insist that gay marriages be monogamous would 
not only deny autonomy but also impose a normative judgment for 
which there is no basis in policy or in our society's traditions-that two 
men (or women) can marry, but that three men (or women) cannot 
marry. 
Polygamy could not be limited to gays. Once the total ban on 
polygamy is breached, it would be inconsistent to forbid polyandry or 
marriages of equal numbers of men and women (such as a four-way 
marriage of two men and two women). Moreover, proponents of gay 
marriage want it treated the same as traditional marriage. That would 
preclude polygamy for gays only. Further, while recognizing gay 
marriages would aggravate the scarcity of marriageable men, polygamy 
would relieve this problem by reducing the numerical disparity 
between single men and women. Thus validating gay marriage would 
also increase the social need for polygamy. 
Monogamy encourages a man to care for his wife (because he can 
have only one) and children (because he is likely to have fewer 
children than a polygynist) .244 Monogamy also protects weaker men by 
preventing stronger men from accumulating harems. Monogamy 
imposes a rule of one-to-a-customer, even though polygyny might be 
favored not only by alpha males but also by women who would prefer 
sharing a strong husband to sole possession of a weak one or to having 
GEO. LJ. 1 871 , 1 878-79 ( 1997) ;  David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Mmriage, 26 HOF­
STRA L. REV. 53, 79-82 ( 1997) ; Chai Feldblum, A Progressive Moral Case Jar Same-Sex Marriage, 7 
TEMP. POL. & CN. RTS. L. REV. 485, 490 ( 1998) .  
243 See Teresa Stanton Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Maniage: Asking for the Impossible?, 47 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 245, 1 256 ( 1 998) . 
244 See POSNER, supra. note 1 ,  at 95, 216, 258. 
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n o  husband a t  all. 245 
Efforts by proponents of gay marriage to distinguish polygamy are 
unpersuasive and sometimes laughably disingenuous. William 
Eskridge waxes eloquent about the threat polygamy poses to the 
companionship between husband and wife,246 but after this encomium 
he drops an endnote disclaiming any position on polygamy among 
gays. 247 His reticence is not surprising since any discrimination 
between gay and heterosexual polygamy would be impossible to 
square with his insistence on "formal equality."248 He is numb to the 
uniqueness of the relationship between husband and wife that de­
mands monoga..-ny for u"lem but not for gays or business partnerships. 
Even if polygamy statistically increases certain problems, not all 
polygamous m aniages would be troublesome. Thus a total prohi­
bition of polygamy requires the kind of generalizing that Esluidge 
otherwise condemns. Consider, for example, a man who m arries two 
wives in a country that permits polygamy and who then immigrates to 
Arne1ica, where he must abandon Lhe second wife or be guil ty of a 
crime.  Viewing the case alone, this result seems harsh and pointless ­
who is harmed by allowing this one exception? Making exceptions is 
Lricky, Lhough, and pushes the law onto a slippery slope. If an 
immigrant may keep two wives, why not three, or twen ty-five? What if 
an American takes a second wife abroad and then re turns? 
Some may sincerely consider polygamy a good model for oth ers, 
just as proponents see gay marriage as a positive m odel . Many people, 
however, view polygamy and gay marriage as contradicting the ideal of 
the traditional, companionate ( i. e. ,  monogamous) ,  heterosexual mar­
riage . Legislation is a blunt instrument; i t  employs general rules cover­
ing broad categories, not individual, ad hoc decisions. Inevi tably, 
then, it is ei tl1er underinclusive or ove1inclusive . As America becomes 
more diverse, we must decide whether to retain or abandon va1ious 
legal tradi tions not shared by new immigrants. For example, P.Jnerica 
has a rapidly growing number of Moslems,249 who condone and may 
245 Some proponents of gay marriage acknowledge this as a possible argument in favor of 
polygyny. See Macedo, supra note 224, at 288 n . 1  05; see a./so POSNER, supra note 1 ,  at 94. 
246 ESKRIDGE, supra. note 9, at 148-49. 
247 ld. at 253 n.56. 
248 ld. at 5 1 , 1 22. 
249 See A Crescent for a Cross: Islam Prospers in America, CHRIST!ANI1Y TODAY, Oct. 28, 199 1 ,  at 
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support legalization of polygamy.250 We can hardly cling to a Chris­
tian, Eurocentric tradition of monogamy if we desert the universal 
tradition against gay marriage. This does not mean that polygamists 
must be rigorously hunted down and prosecuted. It may be sufficient 
to protect society's legitimate interest in monogamy that polygamy be 
tolerated but not validated; indeed, this seems to be the evolving 
attitude toward polygamy. 251 It is the same attitude that now prevails 
toward gay marriage. 
2. Endogamy 
Western law has long banned endogamy.252 Again, the main 
arguments for endorsing gay marriage - individual autonomy in 
intimate affairs and validation of loving relationships - also apply to 
endogamy. The main objection to endogamy - that it causes genetic 
defects-is scientifically feeble.253 Moreover, "we do not forbid 
[unrelated] people who are carrying the same dangerous recessive 
gene to marry each other."254 If the physical health of offspring were 
society's central goal, there are many steps that could be, but are not, 
taken that would be more effective than laws against endogamy. 
Moreover, the rule bars marriage of many people who are not blood 
relatives - such as a parent and an adopted child. Clearly, fear of 
birth defects was not the original reason for the taboo, but is a post­
hoc rationalization. Validating gay marriages would further eviscerate 
the birth-defect argument against endogamy since homosexual 
couples do not reproduce. 
This prohibition is harder to defend than the nonrecognition of 
gay marriage. Homosexuality does not appeal to most people,255 but 
250 See Dirk Johnson, Polygamists Eme1ge from Secm:y, Seeking Not just Peace, But Respect, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 9, 199 1 ,  at A22. 
251 See Chambers, supra note 243, at 71 (polygamy is now rarely prosecuted) . 
252 See JACK GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN EUROPE 31-33 
( 1 983) (describing gradual suppression of endogamy as power of Christianity grew in Europe) ;  
C.  MORRIS, THE PAPAL MONARCHY: THE WESTERN CHURCH FROM 1 050 TO 1 250 331 ( 1989) 
(describing break up of close knit clans and dispersal of property caused by the church's ban 
on endogamy) . 
253 See Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free to 
Marry?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257, 267-81 ( 1984) (calling the genetic case against endogamy weak) . 
Even some courts admit that the genetic objection to endogamy is weak. See Bucca v. State, 1 28 
A.2d 506, 510  (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957) . 
254 POSNER, supra note 1 ,  at 200. 
255 See supra note 1 54. 
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incest was common in p1imitive societies. Indeed, Freud called the 
taboo on incest the greatest wound inflicted on the id by civilization.256 
The argument that same-sex marriage is opposed only because i t  is 
different from the norm and contrary to religious prejudices applies 
even more forcefully to endogamy.257 
The taboo on endogamy is good policy. It stabilizes fam ilies by 
avoiding the friction that would arise between husband and wife and 
between parents and siblings when a parent and child marry. This 
rationale does not apply to endogamous gay marriages since gays bear 
no children to marry. If endogamous gay marriages were permitted, 
though, tl1e principle of equality would require acceptance of endoga­
mous heterosexual marriages. 
Bans on gay marriage and endogamy require a degree of otherness 
or diversity in marriage. Endogamy promotes allegiance to family, 
clan or tribe, not to the larger society. Christianity banned endogamy 
in order to weaken clan ties in favor of devotion to one God and one 
church.258 Gay activists accuse their opponents of fearing what is dif­
ferent, but heterosexuality and exogamy botl1 push us fi-om tl1e famil­
iar toward the different-another family, the other sex and children. 
In this way exogamy and heterosexuality resemble public  education, by 
which government also encourages (and to some extent requires) 
exposure to the world outside ourselves. 
Efforts to tum people outward may be justified on fairly mundane, 
pragmatic grounds-interaction with a variety of people gives citizens 
a better understanding of and concern for society and i ts challenges. 
Again,  the Ramsey Colloquium speaks eloquently: 
Human society requires that we learn to value dif­
ference within community. In the complementarity of 
male and female we find the paradigmatic instance of 
this t<'<-lL� . . . .  [It] invites us to learn to accept and af­
firm the natural world from which we are too often 
alienated. 
Moreover, in the creative complementarity of male 
and female we are directed toward community with 
those unlike us. In the community between male and 
256 SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS <1] Qoan Riviere trans., 1 982 ) .  
257 See Bratt, supra note 254 (defending endogamy) . 
258 See supm note 253. 
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female, we do not and cannot see in each other mere 
reflections of ourselves. In learning to appreciate this 
most basic difference, and in forming a marital bond, 
we take both difference and community seriously.259 
633 
This complementarity can also be justified as an end in itself-that 
is, that interaction with others different from ourselves is good in itself, 
part of human flourishing.260 
William Eskridge's ambivalent discussion of exogamy is instructive. 
He admits that exogamy may be desirable because it requires 
"reach [ing] beyond" one's own family,261 but he does not ask whether 
heterosexuality may be a desirable "reaching beyond" one's own 
gender. Predictably then, he hedges, calling this justification 
"tentative" and declaring himself "open to the argument" that 
restrictions on endogamy are unconstitutional.262 Not surprisingly, 
some domestic partnerships laws are open to close relatives.263 
3. Artificial Reproduction and Baby-Selling 
Arguments for gay marriage based on equality and reproductive 
freedom also apply to artificial reproduction. Not surprisingly, this is 
now a civil rights issue for many homosexuals. 264 Gays can reproduce 
only by artificial means. If gay marriages become valid, equality and 
259 The Homosexual Movement: A Response by the Ramsey Colloquium, supra note 1 05, at 1 7. 
26° Friendship, mutual affection, and a desire for justice are values that involve relations 
with others and that many philosophers have considered intrinsically good. See CAMBRIDGE 
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 830 (Robert Audi, ed., 1995). 
261 ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 151 .  
262 !d. 
263 See 31 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie Supp. 1999) (listing requirements for 
status of "reciprocal beneficiaries," which do not exclude close relatives);  31 HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 572C-2 (Michie Supp. 1999) (listing findings of the state legislature which include 
"individuals who are related to one another" as covered by the law) . 
264 See Christopher Rapp, Gay Clones, HETERODOXY, May, 1997, at 4 (describing efforts of 
the Clone Rights United Front). Laurence Tribe has recognized the connection between 
cloning and gay rights, including gay marriage. See Laurence H. Tribe, Second Thoughts on 
Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1 997, at 31; see also John A. Robertson, Emb1yos, Famt'lies and 
Procreative Liberty: The Legal Sl'ructure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 960 ( 1986) 
( " [T]he couple's interest i n  reproducing is the same, no matter how conception occurs, for the 
values and interests underlying coital reproduction are equally present."). The Vermont 
Supreme Court cited the use of "assisted-reproductive techniques" by gay couples to justifY 
their right to the same legal benefits as traditional married couples. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 
864, 881 (Vt. 1999) .  
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autonomy could require that gays be allowed to use artificial reproduc­
tion , which will then become common, vvith consequences tl1at are 
hard to predict but may be dire . 
President Clinton has forbidden the use of federal m oney for 
human cloning,265 and some states outlaw cloning altogetl1 er.266 Such 
laws are harder to defend than the invalidity of gay m arriages, 
polygamy, and endogamy. There is no legal tradition against cloning. 
Much condemnation of cloning comes from religious figures or car­
ries religious overtones (such as warnings agoinst humans playing 
God) . Thus opponents of cloning, like opponents of polygamy, 
endogamy, and gay marriage, can be charged with imposing their ovm 
religious beliefs on others.267 Unlike polygamy, cloning cannot be 
called degrading to women. 268 Unlike endogamy, i t  cannot be said to 
cause birtl1 defects. 
The gender equality argument for gay marriage269 is at leas t  as valid 
for cloning. Sexual reproduction forces humans into two rigid 
classes-men are fathers, women are mothers. Even vvitl1 artificial 
insemination of a lesbian, a supposedly anonymous sperm donor 
might be iden tified and assert rights as a father. Artificial insemination 
is even more problematic for gay men , who must find an egg donor 
and a gestational (or birtl1) rnotl1er, who may be different people, 
both of whom could assert legal 1ights over the child. Cloning permits 
people to break free of these sex-based categories. 
Like polygamy and endogamy, human cloning can be opposed on 
secular grounds, but these grounds also weigh against sam e-sex 
marriage. First, every child needs both a mother and a father, not only 
because two parents are better than one,270 but also because children 
need intimate contact wi th both halves of humanity, female and male. 
Even with natural reproduction, death ,  divorce or abandonment may 
265 See Remarks Announcing the Prohibition on Federal Funding for the Cloning of Hu7!lan Beings 
aud an Exchange With Reports, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 278 (Mar. 10,  1997) .  
266 See, e.g., C a l .  Health & Safety C o d e  § 24185 (West Supp. 2000) ( imposing five-year 
moratorium on cloning) . 
267 See Tribe, supm note 265 (condemning the invocation of "vague notions of what is 
'natural'" to support the use of the law to outlaw clon ing) . 
268 Cloning can be degrading to women if women's self-esteem and status in soci e ty 
depend in part on th eir unique ability to bear children. If they do, though, this fact also 
argues against legitimizing gay m arriages, which are sterile. 
269 See mpm notes 132-52 and accompanying text. 
270 Se1! supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. 
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deprive a child of one or both parents. But unlike natural repro­
duction, cloning and same-sex marriage guarantee that a child will not 
have both a mother and a father. Cloning can also be opposed as 
contrary to the principle of exposing people to others different from 
themselves. 271 However, this principle also contradicts gay marriage.  
Moreover, the issue on cloning is  a criminal prohibition, which 
requires stronger justification than mere nonrecognition, as is the case 
with same-sex marriage.272 
Most important, cloning and other artificial means of reproduction 
threaten to undermine human freedom and dignity.273 In the Westem 
tradition all people are "endowed by our Creator with certain rights ."  
Manufactured anthropoids, like Frankenstein's creature, are shunned 
as monsters. Some artificial reproduction is tolerated because it is 
used primarily when a physical defect in a spouse prevents natural 
reproduction. Exceptions, like artificial insemination of lesbians, have 
been too rare to attract much criticism. Cloning would be a radical 
change - reproduction where there is no defect in a spouse, or when 
there is no spouse at all. 
Validating gay marriage would make artificial reproduction more 
frequent and visible and provoke more objections. For a same-sex 
couple to manufacture a child with no intention that it have both a 
mother and a father might be considered child abuse, just as polygamy 
has sometimes been judged inherently abusive to children.274 Even 
the time-honored practice of adoption creates emotional problems for 
children.275 Artificial reproduction by gay couples could inflict  greater 
271 See supra notes 1 1 7  & 254 and accompanying texl. 
272 See supra note 1 24 and accompanying text. 
273 See Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 469, 535-
36 ( 1998) ; see also LEON R. KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING ( 1998 ) ;  
Leon R. Kass, Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Human Beings, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41  ( 1999) . 
274 See In re State ex rei. Black, 283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1 955) (finding child neglect solely 
because of parents' polygamy). Recently a woman had sperm retrieved from her husband 30 
hours after he died. The sperm was frozen for 15 months, then injected into the woman, who 
conceived and bore a child. Alexander M. Capron, professor of law and medicine and co­
director of the Pacific Center for Health Policy and Ethics at the University of Southern Cali­
fornia, asked: "Is it appropriate to consciously bring a child into this world with a dead father?" 
A Birth Spurs Debate on Using Sp!?lm Afiu Death, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 1999, at All. The same 
question can be raised about bringing a child into the world with no father, living or dead. See 
supm notes 67-74 on the importance of having both a mother and a father. 
275 See Frank C. Verhulst et aL, Pmblem Behavior in International Adoptees: I. An Epidemiological 
Study, 29 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCH. 94 ( 1 990) (parents report more problem 
behavior  in adopted than in non-adopted children) . 
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psychic harm. Further, manufactured children may not be accepted as 
fully human. Although manufactured people are genetically human, it  
would be hard for many people to treat 1 ,000 clones from one person 
as natural human beings. 
Artificial reproduction could erode agape-the unselfish Jove for all 
humanity. In the West, agape stems from Judea-Christian reverence for 
the miracle of life created by God through the union of a woman and 
a man .  Philosophers have long recognized that seeing others as like 
ourselves is a necessary condition to altruism.276 If many people are 
churned out in  laboratories, this reverence may evaporate. To "Jove 
t.hy neighbour as t.�yself'277 and to "do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you"278 may cease to be aspirations if many of our neigh­
bors come from a test tube.279 
Condoning gay marriages would also militate against laws 
forbidding the sale of babies since these laws discriminate against gay 
couples, who cannot reproduce naturally. Like gay maniage, baby­
selling inflicts no direct, proximate harm and laws against i t  are 
t.l-:lerefore irrati onal from a mateJialist per.srJective. Richard Posner 
concedes that baby-selling would cause "commodificati on," but 
considers that desirable.280 Posner does not  consider how humans' 
self-image would change· if marriage were severed from procreation 
and children were genetically designed for marketability in labora­
tories and then auctioned to the highest bidder. 281 
276 See generally DAVID FlUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN N.'\TUIU: (Ernest Mossner, ed.  1 969) 
( 1 888);  ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF JVJORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. l'vlacfie, eds. 
1 976) ( 1 759) . 
277 Leviticus 1 9 : 1 8  (King james ) ;  Matthew 1 9:1 9 (Kingjam es) . 
278 The ful l  quote is: "whatsoever ye would that men sh ould do to you, do ye even so to 
them . . . .  " Matthew 7 : 1 2  (King james) . 
279 The religious and ethical arguments against cloning are summarized in NAT' L  
BIOETHICS A.DVJSORY COMM ' N ,  CLONING HUMAN BEINGS 39-83 ( 1 997) . 
280 POSNER, supra note 1, at 409-1 6 (arguing that because "the 'purchasers' ge t no more 
power over the baby than natural parents have over their chi ldren," the commodity that would 
be sold if baby-selling was permitted "is not the baby but the natural m o ther's right to keep the 
baby") . 
281 See David Frum, Dispatches & Dialogues, SLATE (Mar. 1 7, 1 997) , avai lable at 
<h ttp:/ /www.slate.msn.com/Dialogues2/97-03-l 1 /Dialogucs.asp?imsg=3 ("Gay marriage is 
maybe not the very last step to the transformation of children into commodities. But i t's close 
to the last.") . 
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4. Bestiality) etc. 
Like incest and polygamy, and unlike homosexuality, bestial 
relations are a crime in most states.282 A materialist defense of this 
taboo is hard to discern. It  cannot be the protection of animals, 
which, after all, can be killed for food or clothing.283 Bestiality poses 
less of a threat than does homosexuality to spread disease or to divert 
people from socially constructive conduct. Moreover, many people 
love their pets and might like to marry them even if they do not want 
sex with the pet. 
Bestiality and homosexuality can be differentiated in conventional 
morality. Many cultures have accepted at least some homosexual 
conduct, but few have accepted bestiality. In the West homosexuality 
is now grudgingly tolerated in general, but bestiality is considered 
-revolting, degrading to humans, an offense human dignity. Advocates 
of gay marriage, however, reject conventional morality, including any 
restriction of sexual freedom imposed simply because society considers 
an act disgusting or degrading. If one invokes this principle to support 
gay marriage, there is no honest basis for rejecting marriage with ani­
mals. 
Arguments for gay marriage also raise questions about other 
forbidden sexual acts which inflict no immediate, tangible harm, such 
as necrophilia, nudity and performance of sex acts in public, and 
exposing children to pornography. Most people suspect that these 
acts cause harm, just as they suspect that legitimizing gay marriages 
would cause harm; but proving a compelling state interest would be at 
least as hard in the former cases as in the latter. 
5. Child Marriage 
William Eskridge defends minimum age laws for marriage,284 but 
this position, too, clashes with his arguments for gay marriage. He says 
"adolescents are immature decision makers" and "are prone to bad 
decisions. "285 However, minimum age laws vary from state to state,286 
though maturation does not vary by state. Given Eskridge's claim that 
282 See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity of Statutes Making Sodomy a Criminal Offense, 
20 A.L.R. 4th 1 009, 1 032-41 ( 1983). 
283 See POSNER, supm note 1 ,  at 230-3 1 .  
284 See ESKRIDGE, supm note 9, at 1 46-47. 
285 !d. at 1 47. 
286 !d. at 1 46. 
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t h e  right to marry is trumped only by a compelling state in terest, and 
since states with lower age laws have experienced no catastrophe, there 
can be no compelling need for anything but the l owest m inimum age 
laws. 
Esluidge says adolescents "are prone to bad decisions," but he offers 
no proof of this claim as to marriage. Given the instability of gay male 
couples,287 i t  is unlikely that adolescent marriages would be less 
successful. Absent contrary proof, how can there be a constitutional 
right of m arriage for gays but not for adolescents? Even if a statistical 
difference in favor of gay marriage could be shown, it would only be 
the lund of generalization that Eshidge opposes as a basis for law­
making. For exat11ple, he rej ects a distinction between gay and 
tradi tional marriage based on reproduction because some traditional 
married couples are sterile.288 By this reasoning, adolescent marriage 
cannot be denied simply because some adolescen ts lack m atmity; 
clearly some adolescents are mature and some adults are immat�ure. 
Minimum age laws can be vindicated only on grounds that also 
apply to gay m arriages. The desire of two (or more) people to marry 
does not always trump society's interest in marriage as an institution 
for child-rearing and socialization. The law may justly prefer that 
adolescen ts acquire education and job skills before they marry so that 
they can properly care for their children . Not all adolescents will so 
use tl1is time, and some will conceive children out of wedlock, but 
tl1ese facts do not invalidate tl1e general rule. Ratl1er, given the role of 
marriage as an aspirational model, the law may properly require a 
minimum age for marriage. Since reasonable people can disagree 
about the proper minimum age, state laws may vary. Similarly, society 
may legi timately decide that i ts interests in child-rearing and 
socialization are best served by preserving tl1e traditional m odel of 
marriage which excludes same-sex marriage. 
6. Conclusion 
Advocates of same-sex marriage profess to champion "families we 
choose," but most defend restrictions on maniage and reproduction 
that are in principle indistinguishable from same-sex marriage and 
that would, therefore, probably collapse if same-sex maniages were 
recognized . 
287 See supra note 230 and infra note 305. 
288 ESIUUDGE, mpm n o te 9, at 96-98. 
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F. Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Would Trigger Demands for Religious 
Exemptions 
639 
Legally recognized marriages are not only treated specially by 
govemment but are also required by law to be treated in certain ways 
by private parties. For example, employers must grant certain benefits 
to married employees. 289 Obeying such laws for gay marriages would 
violate the religious beliefs of many citizens, who would seek 
exemption from these laws. Indeed, this has already happened. 
Recently San Francisco required municipal contractors to extend 
certain benefits to same-sex partners of employees.290 The Catholic 
diocese objected that its compliance would tacitly endorse homosexual 
acts in contradiction of the church's tenets. The dispute was resolved 
when the church agreed to let unmarried employees designate a loved 
one to receive benefits. Since the designee could be a relative or 
friend without being a gay partner, this policy satisfied the law without 
implying approval of homosexual acts. 291 
Although this conflict was finessed, similar spats would not always 
be resolved to mutual satisfaction. Religious objectors probably have 
no constitutional right to relief from such laws.292 However, some 
states have religious freedom laws that exempt citizens from laws that 
violate their religious faith unless the state has a compelling reason to 
demand compliance.293 There is no compelling reason for the state to 
require citizens to treat same-sex marriages as valid. Thus, laws 
validating same-sex marriages would be subject to a religious exception 
in these states and would feed demands for exemptions in states that 
do not already have religious freedom laws. Such demands would 
generate disputes that undermine the goal of encouraging tolerance 
289 See, e.g., Family Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 ( 1994) (requiring certain employers to 
grant employees leave i n  some situations) . 
290 SAN FRANCISCO, CA., ORDINANCE 97-96-33.1  ( 1996) . 
291 See Nancy ]. Knauer, Domestic PaTtnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A Mmketpla.ce 
Innovation and a Less Than Perfect Institutiorw.l Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & CN. RTS. L. REV. 337, 341  
( 1998) (discussing the  ordinance and the controversy surrounding it) . 
292 " [T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply 
with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability . . .  "' Employment Div., Dep't. of Human 
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 ( 1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 
( 1  982) (Stevens,].,  concurring) ) .  
293 The Supreme Court held the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
unconstitutional, at least as applied to the states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521  U.S. 507, 534-36 
(1997) . 
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of hom osexuality. 
G. Validating Gay Marriages Will Fuel Hostility to Religion 
Because America's largest religious denominations all condemn 
homosexuality, legal validatio n  of same-sex m arriages would delegi­
timize these sects. Many gay activists desire this consequence. They 
hope that, with the law's moral backing, traditional religious attitudes 
toward homosexuality "will ultimately be discredited and forced to the 
margin.  "291 Their particular target is Catholicism, and their goal is to 
"Stop the Church"295 by tactics that include desecratio n  of the Mass. 
1 11e1r language is often VICious. In his award-winning book, On 
Becoming a Man, Paul Monette called opponents of gay activism "the 
Nazi Popes and all their brocaded m inions, the rat-brain politicians, 
the wacko fundamen talists and their Book of Lies. "296 As already 
noted,297 legal recognition of sam e-sex marriages would force religious 
people and institutions to seek exemptions from various l aws. Th e 
very n ecessity of seeking such exemptions m akes the p eti tioners 
appear aberrational. 
Moreover, churches that disapprove same-sex marriages could lose 
their t:a.'\: exemptions. The Supreme Court compelled the In ternal 
Revenue Service to withdraw the tax exemption of Bob Jones Univer­
sity because it forbade interracial dating among students. AJ though the 
school rule broke no law, the Court held that i t  contravened a national 
policy against racial separation and therefore disqualified the school 
from a tax exemption. 298 If gay marriages are l egally recognized, 
churches that refuse to acknowledge or perform them could l ose their 
t:t.."'C exenlptjons on tJ1e same theor-y of vi olating natio11al policy even if 
the refusal did not break any law. 299 
Tradi tional Jews and Christians could also suffer employment 
29·1 Larry W. Yackle, Parading Ounelves: Freedom of Sj;eech at the Feast of Sl. Patrick, 73 B.U. L.  
REv. 79 1 , 792 ( 1 993) .  See generally Duncan, sujna note 1 6. 
295 This is the title of a documen tary film about the disruption and desecration of a 
celebration of the Mass by AIDS and homosexual activists at St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York 
City. See Duncan , supra note 1 03, at 601-04.  
296 PAUL !vlONETfE, ON BECOMING A l\1AN 2 ( 1 99 2 ) .  
297 See sujmi notes 290-93 a n d  accompanying text. 
298 Bob Jones U niv. v. United States, 461 U.S. 57-1 ( l  983 ) .  
299 See, e.g., Judith C. Miles, Beyond Bob Jones: Towrnd the Elimination of Govemuumtol Subsidy 
of Discriminolion by l'IJ;ligiolis Instit-utions, 8 HARV. WOMEN's LJ 3 1 ,  34 ( 1 985) (argu i n g  for denial 
of tax benefits to churches that discriminate ) .  
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discrimination if employers are forbidden to discriminate against 
homosexual employees, customers, etc. Because traditional Jews and 
Christians consider homosexual acts sinful, they might be considered 
likely to offend homosexuals. Indeed, a mere statement that one is a 
Jew or Christian might offend homosexuals. Employers might, there­
fore, feel constrained to exclude or to limit the job opportunities of 
traditional Jews and Christians. 
Religion is generally a positive force in America,300 so activity that 
acts to fuel hostility toward religion is harmful, even to th e  interests of 
homosexuals. Although our principal religious denominations 
condemn homosexual acts, they also advocate love and understanding 
for, and deplore violence against, homosexuals.301 Thus hostility 
against traditional religious sects is likely not only to anger their 
adherents but also to weaken the restraints that these sects exert on 
violence and discrimination against gays. 
H. Public Health 
Same-sex marriage is sometimes touted as a means of improving the 
health of homosexuals. The theory is that gay promiscuity, which 
spreads AIDS and other diseases, results from social condemnation of 
homosexuality and a lack of proper models: legal recognition would 
encourage gay marriage and discourage promiscuity.302 It is question­
able how far this goal would be realized. If social disapproval caused 
homosexual promiscuity, lesbians would also be promiscuous, but they 
are not.303 Americans have grown more tolerant of homosexuality in 
recent decades, but this has not reduced gay men's promiscuity, and 
the cities most tolerant of homosexuality have the most promiscuity. 
Even the threat of AIDS and other diseases only slightly (and perhaps 
300 See generally LEWY, supm note 205. 
301 In a pastoral letter entitled "Always Our Children" the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops said: "God does not love someone any less simply because he or she is homosexual." 
The letter encouraged parents to love gay children. Bishops Say Gay Children Need Support, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1 ,  1997, atAI4 (quoting the letter) . 
302 See ESKRIDGE, supm note 9, at 8-10, 209 (validating gay marriages would "civilize" gays 
and reduce promiscuity) . Andrew Sullivan considers the widespread promiscuity of gays "de­
praved" but says it is not "inevitable" but occurs only because gays now lack the proper "social 
incentives." SULLNAN, supra note 101 ,  al 1 07. If gay marriages were valid, most gays would 
marry "with as much (if not more) commitment as heterosexuals." ld. at 1 83. 
303 See infra note 31 1 .  
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temporarily) reduced promiscuity.304 It seems that men tend to be 
promiscuous. 305 
In married men promiscuity is curbed by the attitudes of >vives and 
children and by their demands on the man's time and m oney. "It is 
not heterosexuality that contributes stability [ to marriage] , but the 
presence of a female."306 Society has reason to deter adultery-it 
disrupts families and thus injures children. Advocates of gay marriage, 
though, laud its greater tolerance of adultery.307 Further, the social en­
dorsement conveyed by legitimizing gay maniage would facilitate -
homosexual conduct and unsafe sex.308 The public h ealth argument 
for gay mm.�age is at best too weak to overcome the powerful 
arguments against it. 
I. Recognizing Same-Sex 1\!Ianiages 1\!Iay Not Benefit Homosexuals 
Validating gay marriage may not even benefit homosexuals. Few 
gay couples registered under Hawaii 's domestic partnership law.309 
Further, "most lesbians, who grow up facing the same stigmas and the 
same lack of role models as m ale homosexuals, live conventional lives 
and form long-term monogamous relationships. Why, with gay men, 
304 See GABRIEL ROTELLO, SEXUAL ECOLOGY 92-95, 1 1 1  ( 1 997) (stating that  gay promiscuity 
thrives despite AlDS and that many gays oppose any effort to discourage promiscuity) ; 
MICHAELANGELO SIGNORILE, LIFE OUTSIDE 227-32, 306-07 ( 1 997) (drawing the same 
conclusion) ;  Kevin Sack, H./. 1� Peril and Rising Drug Use, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1 999, at A I O  
(reporting increase o f  unsafe sex among gay men ) .  For philosophical defenses of promiscuity, 
see inji"a. note 3 1 6. Promiscuity is the norm and lasting fidelity the exception among gay men.  
In one study 50% of gay white men reporteri having over 500 sexual partners. Be!! & 
Weinberg, supra note 1 49, at 85. In another only 8% of gay men were "dating" only one per­
son; 87% had multiple partners. Fifty-seven percent reported over 30 partners in the 
preceding year. ADVOCATE, Aug. 23, 1 994, at 22-23. Much of the promiscuity of gay men 
occurs \\�th strangers. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AlviERICAN COUPLES 295, 585-
86 ( 1 983) ; see alm supra note 230. 
305 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 90-92. 
306 DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AlviERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 1 4 1  
( 1 951 ) .  
307 See supra notes 224-33 and accompanying text. 
308 See supra notes 1 5 2-61 and accompanying text (levels of homosexual actiVIty vary 
according to social attitudes) . Married gays might be less likely to use condoms, and m o re 
likely to spread AlDS, because use of condoms implies adultery by oneself o r  one's spouse. See 
Richard A.  Posner, Should The-re Be Homosexual Maniage? And If So, Who Should Decide?, 95 MICH. 
L. REv. 1 578, 1 582 n.8 ( 1 997) .  
309 S!!e supm note 5 7  and accompanying text; see also Foster, supra note 1 ,  a t  327 (noting 
that few gay couples take domestic partnership benefi ts ) .  
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are quasi-marriages the exception to the rule?"310 Men, it seems, are 
more promiscuous than women.3 1 1  Also, the presence of children 
helps to keep married couples together.312 Since homosexual couples 
do not procreate and gay males, at least, rarely adopt, gay marriages 
would be less durable. 
Moreover, many homosexuals despise marriage as stiflint13 and 
fear that validating gay marriage "would further outlaw all gay and 
lesbian sex that is not performed in a marital context."314  For some, 
promiscuity is desirable, not a fault to be corrected by pushing gays 
into marriage.315 Some lesbians disdain marriage as inherently patri­
archal and prefer lesbian communes or question whether lesbian 
lovers should even live together.316 Further, some favor gay marriage 
in order to revolutionize the institution.317 They would probably drop 
their support if recognition meant only extending traditional marital 
31° Krista!, supra. note l l 1 ,  at 46; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 83 ("The majority of 
suiVeys taken in the last twenty years have found more l esbians than gay men in committed 
long-term relationships."). This fact is particularly striking because gay men are more 
numerous than l esbians. See supra note 1 62. 
31 1  See POSNER, supra note 1 ,  at 90-92. 
312 See POSNER, supra note 1 ,  at 305-07, 3 1 2. 
313 See Freiberg, supra note 232; Steven K. Horner, Against Maniage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 505 (1994) ; David W. Dunlap, Some Gay Rights Advocates Question Drive to Defen.d Same-Sex 
Maniage, N.Y. TIMES,June 7, 1 996, atA12. 
314 Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since ·when is Mamage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall ,  1 9 89, at 
9, 1 6, reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 401 ,  403 (William Rubinstein, ed., 1993);  see 
also Charles R.P. Pouncy, Mamage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequality, 7 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 363, 370 ( 1998) ('The extension of same-sex marriage will cloak gay 
and lesbian couples in the traditions of patriarchy and heterosexism. Heterosexual norms will 
become the standards applied to lesbian and gay relationships, and the development of queer 
cultural constructions of intimate relationships will be stunted.") (footnote omitted). 
315 For philosophical defenses of promiscuity see DAVID AJ. RlCHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, 
DEATH, AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RlGHTS AND 0VERCRJMINALIZATION 29-63, 87-88, 93-
95 ( 1 982) ; Frederick Elliston, In Defense of homiscuity, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEX 
AND LOVE 146 (Robert M. Stewart, ed. 1995 ) ;  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Gay Culture Weighs Sense and 
Sexuality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1 997, at B6 (describing debate among gays in which some "argue 
that promiscuous sex is the essence of gay liberation") . 
316 See RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT) LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 1 24-27 
( 1 992) ;  Ettelbrick, supra note 314, at 14-17;  Freiberg, supm note 225; at 1 8; SARAH LUCIA 
HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETHICS: TOWARD NEW VALUE ( 1988); CLAUDIA CARD, LESBIAN CHOICES 
( 1995) ; Nancy D. Polikoff, supra note 53, at 1536 (calling marriage "an inherently problematic 
institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism" 
and that "the desire to marry in the lesbian and gay community is an attempt to mimic the 
worst of mainstream society") .  
317 See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text. 
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norms to homosexuals. 
The push for legal recognition may also be a strategic error. Mter 
the decision in Baehr v. Lewin opposition to · gay marriage grew in 
Hawaii.318 The quest for recognition also incurs opportunity costs. 
The energy it absorbs could, for example, be used to deter gay bashing 
and to reduce the spread of HIV and AIDS and help those already 
infected. The push for legal recognition of gay marriage may also 
alienate potential allies on these other issues. 
David Chambers, who favors gay marriage, notes that Mormons 
were reviled and persecuted in the 19th Century, largely because they 
practiced polygamy. He says "the Mormons triumphed through 
surrender. Mter disavowing plur.:U marriage, they were accepted into 
'civilized' society and have thrived."319 The hostility to gay marriage 
manifested in adoption of the Defense of Marriage Act and similar 
state laws320 while society simultaneously grows more tolerant of other 
aspects of homosexuality suggests that retreat on the issue of same-sex 
marriage might be a wise tactic for those who seek greater social 
acceptance ofhomosexuality. 
This article will not try to resolve or even join the debate among 
homosexuals; it merely notes the existence of the debate and the 
corollary that we cannot a5sume that legal recognition of same-sex 
marriages is desired by or desirable for homosexuals. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Those who have advocated legal recognition of same-sex marriage 
have acted in good faith belief that it would benefit homosexuals 
without harming others. It is now clear that this belief is false. The 
advocates should reconsider their position and, if they truly care about 
the well-being of our children and of our society, present and future, 
they should support traditional marriage. 
318 In a 1993 poll roughly 60% opposed gay marriage, 30% favored it, and 10% were 
undecided. See Same-Sex Marriages Not So Popular, HONOLULU STAR.-BULL.,June 1 9, 1 993, at AI ;  
Linda Hosek, Poll: Unions for Gays Won't Hurt Isle Image, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Feb. 3, 1 994, at 
A6. A 1996 poll found opposition had risen to 7I %. See Same-Sex Maniages Opposed by 71 % in 
Pol� HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 23, 1996, at AI. 
319 Chambers, supra. note 243, at 77; see also Ralph Wedgwood, What An We Fighting FoT?, 
HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REv., Fall 1 997, at 32-33 (advocating pursuit of the rights and benefits of 
marriage for gays and not "'marriage' as such") . 
320 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
